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Judicial Review of Discretionary
Immigration Decisionmaking
MICHAEL G. HEYMAN*
The Immigration and Nationality Act vests enormous discretion
in the Attorney General and her subordinates, a discretion exer-
cised frequently at all levels of the immigration system. Despite
this, though, judicial review of these decisions has followed a very
uneven, troubled course. This Article will explore the reasons for
this, focusing first on the Administrative Procedure Act and the
elusive meaning of discretion itself. It will demonstrate the "disin-
tegration" of administrative law and the failure of its general
precepts to accommodate immigration issues. Next, it will trace
the development of faulty doctrine through case law, resulting in a
terribly stunted judicial review. Finally it will reveal the necessity
for developing a more particularized approach to judicial review
to afford aliens effective access to our legal system.
INTRODUCTION
Aliens are outsiders in this country. This seeming truism is so in
both a figurative and decidedly literal sense. Not only are they sepa-
rate from our national community,' but they are likewise frequently
outsiders to our legal system. This is especially so in deportation.
Though the deportation process embodies many of the protections
one expects from a mature legal system,2 relief from deportation is
* Professor, The John Marshall Law School.
1. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and "Community Ties":
A Response to Martin, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 237 (1983); see also Jamin B. Raskin, Legal
Aliens, Local Citizens; The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of
Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1391 (1993).
2. See generally 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1988) (Immigration and Nationality Act
often circumscribed dramatically by the presence of a virtually ubiq-
uitous discretion reposed in the Attorney General. And, though she
rarely exercises this discretionary power directly, her subordinates do
so constantly.
In and of itself, perhaps this seems unexceptional. Discretion is no
stranger to administrative law. However, because of the convergence
of several dominant themes, discretion has been used as a catchword
that justifies potentially arbitrary immigration decisionmaking.
Worse yet, judicial review has often been impotent to check this pro-
cess. Through an insidious synergism of doctrines, discretion has
often become a mantle insulating immigration decisions from mean-
ingful review.
The first theme contributing to this dilemma is that of plenary
power. This notion is captured by the chilling declaration by the Su-
preme Court that: "Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress
is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned."3
Though the Knauff case dealt with the exclusion of a resident alien,
it aptly expresses the mood that immigration legislation is largely
immune from constitutional review. And, though plenary power has
eroded somewhat recently,4 it retains considerable resilience., Per-
haps this resilience owes to the notion that "the nation's immigration
laws represent the exercise by the 'owners' of the national property
of their collective right to use the property as they please." 6 By that
view, aliens who have overstayed their welcome can complain little,
for they then become uninvited guests, even trespassers. Though the
plenary power doctrine technically applies only to constitutional at-
tacks on immigration legislation, its judicial adoption reflects a mood
decidedly unfavorable to aliens. This mood is intensified by a second,
related factor which has stultified judicial review. An alien seeking
(INA) and amendments).
3. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
4. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982). The Supreme Court
moved away from the mechanical concept that aliens are perpetually subject to exclusion
and thus possess no extra-statutory remedies, and employed an explicit Matthews v. El-
dridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), analysis in determining the process due a returning perma-
nent resident alien in exclusion proceedings. Id.
5. For a critique of the plenary power theory, see, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic,
66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1389-96 (1953); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and
the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SuP. CT. REv. 255; Ibrahim J.
Wani, Truth, Strangers, and Fiction: The Illegitimate Uses of Legal Fiction in Immi-
gration Law, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 51, 51-53 (1989); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration
Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory
Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990).
6. Legomsky, supra note 5, at 269. Professor Legomsky offered this as one possible
justification for the notion of plenary power. Id. However, he went on to note that the
question should not be one of the proper source of congressional power over immigration,
but of its proper exercise. Id.
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the favorable exercise of discretion is usually someone subject to de-
portation.7 Thus, having violated our immigration laws, she then
turns to the system seeking discretionary relief. She appeals to our
compassion, seeking to remain in this country. Yet such a claim
seems incompatible with an entitlement. That is, if the initial deci-
sionmaker need not afford relief, it's hard to understand how the
alien can have any claim of right to that relief which must be recog-
nized by an appellate court.8 Though this seems to resurrect the
somewhat dated rights-privilege dichotomy,9 it need not. Whether it
does depends on what we mean by discretion. It's easy to see, then,
how discretionary decisionmaking, especially regarding aliens, would
seem like an unlikely candidate for rigorous judicial review.
The final force leading to the stunted judicial review of immigra-
tion decisions is the general development of the law of the un-
reviewability of administrative action. Within one year in the 1980s,
the Supreme Court authored two critical decisions affecting judicial
review of administrative action. First, in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Na-
tional Resources Defense Council, Inc.,"0 a unanimous Court held
that if a statute is silent or ambiguous, a court should defer to an
agency's permissible construction of that statute and not engage in
its own construction." Though Chevron has not been interpreted
7. That is, the discretion previously referred to exists in statutes which potentially
provide discretionary relief from deportation. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(c), 1254(a) (1983 &
Supp. V 1993).
However, a nonimmigrant who has not violated her immigration status may apply af-
firmatively for asylum, yet have it discretionarily denied. The statute provides that she
"[m]ay be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General." 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)
(1988).
8. Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373-81 (1987). The Court discussed
the relationship between the discretionary nature of parole decisions and whether the
prisoner had a cognizable liberty interest. Id. Though the majority perceived no incom-
patibility between official discretion and a liberty interest, the dissenters decidedly dis-
agreed. Id. at 383 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). By their view, "an entitlement is created by
statute only if 'particularized standards or criteria' constrain the relevant deci-
sionmakers." Id. at 382-83 (quoting Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S.
458, 467 (1981)).
9. See, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinc-
tion in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968) (discussing the rights and
privileges dichotomy).
10. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
11. Id. at 843-44.
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the
statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.
Id. (footnote omitted).
uniformly, it is widely regarded as a case insulating the executive
from judicial scrutiny. 12 But Chevron does not stand alone.
Within a year after Chevron, the Court attempted to reconcile two
seemingly conflicting provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act.1 3 While the Act permits a reviewing court to set aside agency
action found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law," 14 it also insulates from review
any matters "committed to agency discretion."1 5 In Heckler v. Cha-
ney,"6 the Court concluded that when a court has "no meaningful
standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion
...the statute ('law') can be taken to have 'committed' the deci-
sionmaking to the agency's judgment absolutely."17 Thus, there is
simply no law to apply and judicial review would be futile.
Taken together, these cases can virtually eliminate meaningful ju-
dicial review. Many statutes, including a host of immigration stat-
utes, simply provide no manageable standards for the exercise of
discretion. Their interpretation would seem to be confined to the
agencies in the first instance, and even then, in the absence of inter-
nal standards for interpretation, it is hard to see how they can avoid
a fateful brush with Heckler."8 Untethered to any controlling stan-
dards, the notion of discretion reposes virtually uncheckable power in
decisionmakers. Judicial review would seem futile, if not impossible.
But that need not be. In this Article, I will show how judicial re-
view is virtually indispensable to the successful operation of the ad-
ministrative state. The Administrative Procedure Act set certain
bounds for the exercise of judicial review. It reflects a recognition
that some matters must be decided by agencies, unhampered by ju-
dicial second-guessing. And that makes sense. Agencies, as creatures
of statute, often forge those policies that cannot practicably be em-
bodied in their legislative charters. This is part of what they do and
should do.
However, that position can lead to absurd excesses. Presumably,
12. Indeed, heralding Chevron as an important and needed decision, Justice Scalia
commented: "Chevron, however, if it is to be believed, replaced this statute-by-statute
evaluation (which was assuredly a font of uncertainty and litigation) with an across-the-
board presumption that, in the case of ambiguity, agency discretion is meant." He fur-
ther stated that "[b]road delegation to the Executive is the hallmark of the modern ad-
ministrative state . . . ." Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516.
13. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706 (1988).
14. Id. § 706(2)(A).
15. Id. § 701(a)(2). .
16. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
17. Id. at 830.
18. It should be pointed out that Heckler, by its own terms, only included "agency
refusals to institute investigative or enforcement proceedings, unless Congress has indi-
cated otherwise." Id. at 838.
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as part of the executive branch, agencies are politically accountable.
But that is surely more fiction than reality. Thus, I will show that
the view that agencies should be deferred to because of their political
legitimacy is naive and unrealistic.19 Moreover, the model of judicial
review spawned by this thinking is likewise misguided. Courts need
not be viewed as antagonists of the agencies, frequently seeking to
smuggle in their notions of justice in the face of agency decisionmak-
ing. Rather, the relationship must be reconceptualized to reflect the
need for dialogue between the two branches, a dialogue that can lead
to the orderly and coherent development of the law. This notion will
be developed in the first part of this Article.
In the second part of this Article, I will explore the concept of
discretion itself to demonstrate the variety of notions encompassed in
that seemingly simple word. The incantation of the word "discre-
tion" is a conversation stopper. It would seem to mean that someone
has exercised a power unconstrained by legal rules. In that vein, it
would lead to the notion that review of discretion is doomed for the
following reason: one cannot determine if discretion is abused if no
determinate standards exist for its use. By that view, review would
seem to be impossible.20 Here, I will rely on various threads of juris-
prudential literature to explore the concept of discretion and expose
the various meanings attributed to that word. Thus, since little
agreement exists on its meaning beyond the barest superficialities, it
is striking that the literature of all three branches of government
treats it as a unitary, coherent concept.
In the third part, I will examine how this "discretion talk" has
resulted in confusion in a variety of areas of immigration law. Spe-
cifically, I will focus on several lines of cases to demonstrate the ori-
gins and spread of some profoundly misguided doctrine. This
doctrine reflects the common features of a retreat from meaningful
judicial review and the resulting willingness to leave the development
of immigration standards to the administrative system. But these ju-
dicial developments represent an unacceptable insensitivity to the
human dimension of these cases.
Finally, then, I will show the necessity for courts to adopt a more
19. Indeed, immigration decisionmaking does not result from the operation of a
cohesive, unitary body, but is both ideologically and even geographically diffused. This
assuredly belies the notion that the law, at the agency level, speaks with one voice.
20. That assumes, of course, that no standards have been articulated. If they have,
the situation changes. However, my point is that the very concept of discretion often
embodies the view that it isn't rule-based, and leads to reactive decisionmaking that is
neither demonstrably correct or incorrect. It is simply "discretionary."
pragmatic approach to review, tailoring the degree of scrutiny to the
particular demands of different kinds of cases. This approach results
from the practical necessities of recognizing the various forms that
discretion takes and the profoundly human aspect of immigration
cases. Though this approach probably reflects what some courts are
doing, that should be removed from the shadows and more openly
and clearly elaborated.
I. UNREVIEWABILITY LAW
"Administrative law is inseparable from constitutional and politi-
cal theory. ' 21 Though unquestionably true, this seeming axiom has
led numerous commentators in as many directions. Yet, perhaps this
welter of reactions reflects a failure to grasp the role of agencies in
the administrative state.
Agencies are the product of the legislation creating them. This
legislation, inquestionably wide-ranging, operates in a vast variety of
areas. And, agencies engage in numerous functions, of which
rulemaking and adjudication are only the most obvious examples. In
these functions agencies must frequently interpret their governing
statutes in their efforts to act in harmony with this law. Yet, these
statutes are frequently open textured,2" often providing only sketchy
guidelines for the agencies to follow. Thus, agencies must frequently
proceed based on a kind of best guess of whether their actions will be
consonant with their statutes.
Commentators have not reacted happily to this absence of discern-
ible standards. Professor Pierce has created a typology of four kinds
of statutory standards for agency action: meaningful standards,
traditional empty standards, lists of unranked decisional goals, and
contradictory standards. 3 Obviously, only the first category com-
ports with a conventional concept of law. The others leave the agen-
cies with enormous power to engage in the creation of law. This fact
has led many, including Pierce, to the conclusion that Congress is
not doing its job properly. It has delegated lawmaking quite obvi-
ously to the executive branch. But it is unclear how the legal system
should react to that notion.
21. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory In
Administrative Law, 64 TEx. L. REv. 469, 470 (1985).
22. I borrow this term from H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). Hart
believed that all rules possess a "fringe of vagueness or 'open texture'. . . ." Id. at 120.
From this he concluded that "there are, indeed, areas of conduct where much must be
left to be developed by courts or officials striking a balance, in the light of circumstances,
between competing interests which vary in weight from case to case." Id. at 132.
23. See Pierce, supra note 21, at 473-78.
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A. Delegation and Separation of Powers
For a brief time, the Supreme Court enforced the delegation doc-
trine.24 By that view, any statute delegating an unguided authority
to an agency was unconstitutional. This view flowed from the general
maxim that: "[T]he general rule of law is, that a delegated authority
cannot be delegated. 25 Thus, since Congress draws its power from
the Constitution, it cannot, constitutionally, redelegate its legislative
power. However, the delegation doctrine has remained inert since
1935.
Yet doubts obviously remained about the wisdom, even the legal-
ity, of reposing substantial lawmaking power in agencies.26 And it's
here that legal commentary has been most divided. By some views,
agency lawmaking would seem to be a practical necessity. It would
seem to fill in that necessarily open texture of statutory law. Viewed
in that manner, not only must agencies exercise this function, but
that exercise must be honored because of the separation of govern-
mental powers. That is, since agencies are part of the executive
branch, they are politically accountable. They are, then, by this
view, likely candidates for lawmaking. Thus, this argument is practi-
cally grounded in necessity and agency competence, but also has de-
cidedly political theoretical justifications.
Proponents of this view see deference to agencies as a matter of
constitutional duty, though others have grounded deference in vague
notions such as agency expertise or the like.27 Explaining the demise
of the nondelegation doctrine, Professor Douglas Kmiec stated that
24. See Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama
Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
25. Shankland v. Washington, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 389, 395 (1831).
26. Indeed, perhaps the seminal work criticizing the legislative bent of creating
vast amounts of discretionary decisionmaking is Professor Kenneth C. Davis' Discretion-
ary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (1969). Professor Davis states:
But the legislative bodies, sensing the need for administrative discretion on one
problem after another, have gone on delegating, as even the most conservative
legislatures have felt compelled to do. The result is perhaps the most significant
twentieth-century change in the fundamentals of the legal system has been the
tremendous growth of discretionary power .... [I]n this country we have de-
veloped a habit of allowing discretionary power to grow which far exceeds what
is necessary and which is much less controlled than it should be. What we need
to do is to work on the third reason, not to minimize discretion or to maximize
its control, but to eliminate unnecessary discretion and to find the optimum
degree of control.
Id. at 20.
27. Indeed, Justice Scalia posits constitutional duty as the theoretical basis for def-
erence to agency decisions. See Scalia, supra note 12, at 514, 516.
"it is analytically inconsistent and contrary to the assignment of po-
litical responsibility within our constitutional structure for the judici-
ary to tolerate liberal delegations of authority to executive agencies
and, then, selectively undermine or displace that authority when it is
exercised. 2 8
Animating this view are two closely related notions. First, defer-
ence flows from the simple fact that courts refuse to enforce the
nondelegation doctrine. Thus, since delegation is constitutionally tol-
erated, it is odd and unacceptable to second-guess the results of this
delegation: the actions taken by agencies. But that view assumes its
conclusion - namely, that agencies should be deferred to simply be-
cause Congress has not legislated with requisite specificity. It virtu-
ally tells the courts not to interfere unless they are willing to revive
nondelegation. That would seem to allow little breathing room for
judicial review, and constitutes its own analytical anomaly. Courts
now are being denied their essential review function simply because
Congress has done poorly.
But opponents of substantial judicial review are emboldened by a
second factor. They insist that judicial deference is required by ma-
joritarianism.2 9 Distilled to its essence, this view reflects the position
that since agencies are, formally and functionally, part of the execu-
tive branch of government, they are more politically responsive than
judges. In some fashion, at some time, their decisions are subject to
political inspection, and thus must comport with the public will. This
stands in marked contrast to the role of federal judges, who enjoy
lifetime appointments and do not operate in the hurly burly of the
political process. This provides a principled justification for reposing
decisive lawmaking authority in agencies.
However, critics of broad deference likewise seek to protect the
separation of powers, but feel that virtually unreviewed agency deci-
sionmaking violates it. These arguments are more obviously rooted in
notions of constitutional regularity. That is, since Marbury,30 judi-
cial review has been a legal commonplace. Article III of the Consti-
tution31 calls for an independent judiciary and the majoritarian
arguments advanced by advocates of broad deference have an odd
ring.
Even setting aside the likelihood that political accountability of
28. Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline
of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269, 269-70 (1988).
29. See generally Pierce, supra note 21. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelega-
tion: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, I J.L. EcON. & ORO. 81, 98
(1985).
30. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). "It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Id. at 177.
31. U.S. CONsT. art. III.
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agencies is more illusion than reality,32 opponents of judicial review
face what would seem to be advancing a logically untenable position.
Judicial review is always non-majoritarian in some sense. Thus, their
arguments strike at review itself, a clearly indefensible position.33
Some deference will always be required by review courts. However,
advocates of broad deference would tilt the scales massively in favor
of the agencies, thus divesting the courts of an essential function.
This debate has no winner, then. Clearly judges are not politically
accountable. Just as clearly, judicial review represents some form of
interference with the operation of the executive branch. But given
the constitutional requirement of an independent judiciary, courts
obviously must play a role in checking the potential errors and ex-
cesses of the other branches of government. The only real questions,
then, concern the areas in which courts should play a particularly
active role in performing this assigned function. 34
Thus, narrowing the debate to these remaining real questions,
commentators have noted some oddities about judicial review of ad-
ministrative actions. Justice Stephen Breyer, a longtime student of
32. That is, the path from the decisionmaking bureaucrat to the politically ac-
countable member of the executive is so tortuous and attenuated that it is hard to see
how accountability exists in any realistic sense.
33. Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring the Balance of Powers
in the Post-Chevron Era, 32 B.C. L. REV. 757, 814 (1991). He states:
It is peculiar to use majoritarian concerns to defeat judicial review. If we
accept this argument's premise, then judicial review, which is necessarily non-
majoritarian, will always be defeated. At some point, however, one must con-
front the fact that, although majoritarian concerns influenced the Constitution,
the structure of government involves a balance of majoritarian and non-
majoritarian practices and institutions, including the establishment of an inde-
pendent judiciary.
Id. (footnote omitted).
34. Several commentators have acknowledged the non-majoritarian nature of re-
view, but have resisted the view that courts should abdicate their constitutional responsi-
bility. Thus, they correctly note that the question becomes one not of whether or not
deference should be afforded, but rather one of its degree. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro &
Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Quiet Revolution in Ad-
ministrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819, 865. Professor Linda Hirshman has reached a
similar conclusion, writing that:
Neither a free-floating ad hoc procedural solution nor a prescription for inter-
fering where Congress has clearly authorized agency action, judicial review of
agency action for conformity to law, as interpreted by the courts in the exercise
of their constitutional and statutory function of reading statutes, plays an im-
portant role in keeping the system in the balance it requires.
Linda R. Hirshman, Postmodern Jurisprudence and the Problem of Administrative Dis-
cretion, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 646, 676 (1988) (footnote omitted).
administrative law, perceived a particularly strange anomaly. 3 Al-
though we would think that courts would have greater competence to
review issues of law than policy, he concluded that unreviewability
law has taken the opposite turn. Thus, he wrote:
The law 1) requires courts to defer to agency judgments about matters of
law, but 2) it also suggests that courts conduct independent, "in-depth" re-
views of agency judgments about matters of policy. Is this not the exact
opposite of a rational system? Would one not expect courts to conduct a
stricter review of matters of law, where courts are more expert, but more
lenient review of matters of policy, where agencies are more expert?36
Justice Breyer is right. Moreover, his observations reveal a funda-
mental, though often unnoticed, fact about administrative law. Be-
cause of the enormous variety of administrative agencies and
because of the' extraordinary diversity of their subject areas and
kinds of institutional actions, it is simply silly to talk about an ad-
ministrative law. And, if that is true, it is fanciful to believe that the
Supreme Court can create any single standard to guide review
courts.
Professor Elliott captures this nicely in speaking of the "dis-inte-
gration" of administrative law.3 7 Although it is comforting to think
of an administrative law (though resisting the notion of its unitary
quality can lead to untidiness), common reality principles dictate the
recognition of the diffuseness of administrative law. Although the va-
rious areas of administrative law share many characteristics, it is
more apt and more useful to candidly recognize that the overarching
concept of a unitary administrative law appeals more to sentiment
than reality. Instead, as Elliott suggests, "the center of gravity has
shifted away from the broad, overarching generalizations of the ad-
ministrative law of the 1960's toward more particularistic statutory
and policy objectives." '38
If Elliott is right, as I believe he is, the task is to encourage a
relationship between the judiciary and the agencies that facilitates
the mature development of the law. Much of unreviewablity law and
literature reflects an essential fear of a reckless, policy-mongering
judiciary. It does not admit of the possibility that courts and agen-
cies can work together to develop the law. Thus, unreviewability the-
orists implicitly posit an antagonistic model of the relationship
between these branches of government. But this notion must be re-
sisted in favor of recognition that courts and agencies can join in a
dialogue through which the law can grow to address effectively the
35. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN.
L. REV. 363 (1986).
36. Id. at 397.
37. E. Donald Elliott, Jr., The Dis-Integration of Administrative Law: A Comment
on Shapiro, 92 YALE L.J. 1523 (1983).
38. Id. at 1532 (footnote omitted).
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rich diversity of issues presented.
B. Chevron and Heckler
Thus far, I have been talking about one aspect of unreviewability,
the notion that courts often should defer to agencies in their inter-
pretations of law, a view springing from the Court's unanimous deci-
sion in Chevron. In that case, the Court considered the issue of
"whether [the] EPA's decision to allow States to treat all of the pol-
lution-emitting devices within the same industrial grouping as
though they were encased within a single 'bubble' is based on a rea-
sonable construction of the statutory term 'stationary source.' "9
That.term was part of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. 40
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals had set aside the
regulations calling for this single bubble rule, noting that both the
legislation and its history were inexact on this issue.4
The Supreme Court reversed, noting that the circuit court's basic
error was its adoption of a static definition of the statutory term.42
Instead, the Court held that if Congress has been silent or ambigu-
ous about the meaning of a statutory term, courts should yield to a
permissible agency construction. 43 The Court did this on the express
ground that Congress' failure to elucidate a term constituted a dele-
gation to the agency to interpret the law.4' Thus, by that view, the
agency construction should only be set aside if it is "arbitrary, capri-
cious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. 45
Debate about Chevron has been extensive, even wearisome, so I
will not rehash these issues. However, one fact is clear: a unanimous
Court reposed the primary task of interpretation in the agencies, a
view that would seem to founder on the assignment of roles to these
coordinate branches of government. But that may fail to recognize
the complexity of the issues addressed by agencies and thus may
39. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 840 (1984).
40. Pub. L. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (pertinent amendment codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1988)).
41. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
42. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
43. Id. at 843.
44. Id. at 843-44.
45. Id. at 844.
misconstrue the reach of Chevron. As Professor Pierce noted, Con-
gress often provides agencies with inadequate standards for the per-
formance of their -work.4" This work includes a wide variety of tasks.
Thus, it may make a great deal of sense to defer to agencies on some
issues, yet not on others.
If Chevron reflects the Court's views on the comparative compe-
tence of courts and agencies to decide technical, dynamic issues,
then it offers sensible guidance. Indeed, even Professor Sunstein
noted the virtue in giving agencies the opportunity to administer
their own laws in response to changing facts and needs.47 However,
Sunstein and others have recognized the continued need for courts to
play an instrumental role in the interpretation of statutes, and recog-
nize that Chevron is but one guide in this interpretive venture.
48 If
that is so, then Chevron need not deprive courts of their jurisdiction,
but can fit comfortably within accepted notions of the allocation of
resources within our government.
If, then, Chevron, in and of itself, does not necessarily chill judi-
cial review, this aspect of unreviewability law may be unobjection-
able. Surely Chevron has been misapplied, but that can be corrected.
If the courts can continue to engage in meaningful judicial review
without impugning Chevron, then constitutional regularity can be
restored.
However, unreviewability law contains a second thread, potentially
as hostile to judicial review as Chevron. The "no law to apply" view
of Heckler,49 taken together with Chevron, poses an enormous threat
to constitutional regularity. The Heckler court attempted to resolve
two seemingly irreconcilable provisions of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, one allowing review for abuse of discretion,r0 the other
barring review of matters that are "committed to agency discretion
by law."'51 It did that in the context of the FDA's refusal to take
enforcement actions with respect to drugs used for lethal injections
to carry out the death penalty.
52
46. Pierce, supra note 21, at 473-78.
47. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
2071, 2088-89 (1990). Professor Sunstein states:
In these circumstances, a grant of interpretive authority to administrators, al-
lowing them to take changed circumstances into consideration, seems to be a
valuable if partial corrective. The result is to confer a power of adaptation on
institutions that combine the judicial virtue of continuing attention to individ-
ual contexts and new settings with the legislative virtue of a fair degree of
electoral accountability.
Id. (footnote omitted).
48. Id. at 2105; see also Maureen B. Callahan, Judicial Review of Agency Legal
Determinations in Asylum Cases, 28 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 773, 784 (1992).
49. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
50. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
51. Id. § 701(a)(2).
52. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 823.
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The Court, refusing to second-guess the FDA, simply upheld its
decision not to act in this area. In doing so, it noted that, though
review is generally favored,53 for a narrow range of cases "'statutes
are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to
apply.' "51 Thus, the Court confined this case to the situation in
which an agency had refused to initiate enforcement action under a
statute that provided no guiding standards for the exercise of
discretion.
Viewed narrowly, Heckler is certainly benign. However, it has not
uniformly been read that way. Indeed, one commentator coined the
term "futility theory" to capture one mood of judicial review.5 5 As
Professor Levin explains:
[A]n action should be deemed "committed to agency discretion" if judicial
review would be infeasible and therefore futile. The futility theory is super-
ficially plausible to the extent one equates abuse of discretion review with
an inquiry into whether the agency used legally relevant factors in exercis-
ing its discretion. If there are no legally relevant factors, the argument goes,
a court obviously cannot conduct this inquiry.56
Although Levin argues that substantive review is always possible,
and does not depend on the governing statutes,57 others disagree.
Thus, Levin suggests that "pure" abuse of discretion review is avail-
able and is, indeed, "an integral part of contemporary administrative
law and practice . . . .-5" By his view then, courts are not hampered
by empty statutes, but can inquire into such matters as whether an
agency misunderstood the facts, departed from precedent, or made
an unconscionable value judgment.5 9 Although others agree with
Levin,60 the contrary view has a seductive appeal which has drawn
many to it. And here, the confluence of Chevron and Heckler is
clear.
53. Id. at 829-30.
54. Id. at 830 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 410 (1971)).
55. Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74
MINN. L. REV. 689, 707 (1990).
56. Id. at 707-08 (footnotes omitted).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 708.
59. Id.
60. See. e.g., Kenneth C. Davis, No Law to Apply, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 10
(1988) ("A reviewing court always has the meaningful standard of reasonableness, that
is, the court's own judicial judgment about reasonableness."); Sharon Werner, Note, The
Impact of Heckler v. Chaney on Judicial Review of Agency Decisions, 86 COLUm. L.
REv. 1247, 1266 (1986) ("An agency's discretion, however, is never unlimited. Judicially
manageable standards always exist where the plaintiff alleges that the agency's action
contravenes some universally accepted constraint on agency discretion.").
Chevron easily can be seen as reflecting a mood regarding the
proper relationship between the courts and the administrative state.
By one view, it exhorts courts to adopt an exceedingly deferential
posture regarding agency action. Courts following that view would
find additional support for deference in Heckler. That is, once you
assume an abstemious position, that view is readily reinforced by a
decision which, at least by one reading, tells you not to disturb an
agency decision unless the decision violated articulated statutory
guidelines. Thus, in the absence of such guidelines, Levin's "futility
theory" might govern. And, immigration law is rife with statutes
providing seeming carte blanche for the exercise of discretion.
Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Achacoso-Sanchez v. INS6 1 re-
flects this judicial attitude in virtually pristine form. There, the court
was confronted by an exceedingly litigious alien who had "jumped
the queue . . . and [had] resisted all invitations to rejoin the queue
abroad. 62 His task was to review the denial of various forms of dis-
cretionary relief to her.
In doing so, he first invoked the plenary power doctrine, noting
that "'over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Con-
gress more complete' than with respect to immigration. 6 3 Next, he
found that she could assert no right, since neither the statutes nor
the regulations embodied any objective criteria for application. Thus,
he found no asserted liberty or property interest.64
But Judge Easterbook went beyond this and his comments demon-
strably reveal the "futility theory." His language is particularly
helpful:
The absence of substantive rules means more than just the absence of "lib-
erty or property." It means the absence of standards for judges to use. The
judicial process is a system of rational application of rules to facts. When
there are no rules or standards there is neither legal right nor legal
wrong ....
In the language of administrative law, the grant of discretionary relief
under the immigration laws is a question on which there is "no law to ap-
ply," and when there is no law to apply judicial review is exceedingly con-
stricted. When there is no governing legal rule, it is fatuous to speak of
"error" in the disposition of a given case. Judges, specialists in the applica-
tions of standards of decision to facts, and in the rooting out of error, have
little to contribute.68
Thus, the circle is now closed. This view of judicial review reflects
the conflation of various threads of doctrine. Put bluntly, though, it
reveals an indisposition to afford meaningful judicial review in the
61. 779 F.2d 1260 (7th Cir. 1985).
62. Id. at 1263.
63. Id. at 1264 (quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S.
320, 339 (1909)).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1264-65 (citations omitted).
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absence of articulated statutory or regulatory standards. Since no
such standards exist in immigration law, were Easterbrook's view to
hold sway, judicial review would effectively be closed to all immigra-
tion cases in which aliens seek discretionary relief.
But one facet of Judge Easterbrook's opinion requires closer in-
spection. He used the word "right" in several instances, but with
different meanings. First, he asserted that the alien could not claim a
right to the relief sought. Here, he was speaking about cognizable
legal rights. However, as the opinion progressed, he spoke from the
point of view of the appellate judge, noting that without standards,
that judge could not assess the correctness of the action taken below;
she could not tell whether the agency acted correctly or in error.
This being so, the judge could do little but uphold that view and only
reverse in the presence of egregious action . 6 Easterbrook indissolu-
bly linked these related notions of right, thus closing the door on real
judicial review. In the absence of a claim of right delineated by stan-
dards, any claim of error was effectively futile. Discretion dictated
that.
Unfortunately, throughout much "discretion talk," commentators
refer to discretion as if it were determinate, bearing a single mean-
ing. That is hardly so. Rather, many have argued persistently that
discretion is hydra-headed, possessing a multitude of meanings. If
that is so, then review of discretionary decisionmaking need not take
one cast, but can and should differ markedly from one kind of case
to another. However, though unreviewability law does not bar review
of discretionary decisions, some would foreclose review because of
the nature of discretion itself. It remains to be seen whether that
makes sense.
II. DISCRETION TALK
Discretion talk takes on a particularly annoying cast. Often, the
original decisions are made with little explanation, leaving appellate
66. Judge Easterbrook said that the "Board [of Immigration Appeals (BIA)]
'abuses its discretion' when it acts for a forbidden reason or for a reason that a court can
determine is erroneous." Id. at 1265. Thus, he adopted the view adopted by some other
circuits that: "'The denial [of a motion to reopen] will be upheld unless it "was made
without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested
on an impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination against a particular race or
group."'" Id. (quoting Williams v. INS, 773 F.2d 8, 9 (1st Cir. 1985) which quoted
Balani v. INS, 669 F.2d 1157, 1161 (6th Cir. 1982)) (alteration in Williams). Obviously,
this provides an exceedingly narrow ambit for judicial review.
tribunals to guess at their basis in deciding whether an abuse of dis-
cretion has taken place. Then, after reciting the appropriate stan-
dard of review, 7 the court passes on the discretionary decision. Yet
throughout this dialogue, something is obviously missing. The speak-
ers often seem to be talking past one another, though that fact goes
unnoted. The charade plays itself out with the audience startled at
the ratio of subtext to explicit discussion. Sometimes, though, some-
one breaks this cycle.
In a recent case,68 Judge Richard Posner expressed himself with
unusual candor and force. Reviewing the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals' (Board) affirmance of a discretionary denial by an immigra-
tion judge, Judge Posner used the terms "astonishingly,"
"irresponsible," and "incoherently" to characterize the quality of
reasoning under review. 9 Particularly perturbed by the government's
statement that the Board has no fixed standard of review, thus vary-
ing its standard from case to case, he replied, "[t]hat won't do."7 0
Indeed, Posner seemed particularly irked by the government's easy
explanation of this inconsistency. It is here that he used the word
"incoherently" to describe the argument of the government's law-
yer.7 1 He recoiled at the intellectual flaccidity of the view that if the
Board agreed with the immigration judge it used the abuse of discre-
tion standard, but, if it disagreed, it engaged in de novo review. To
Judge Posner, that simply meant that in posing the very question of
whether the Board agreed with the judge, it was engaging in de novo
review. For him, this totally muddied the notion of review, leading
him to conclude that it was "high time that the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals examined its relationship to the immigration judges. '7 2
Perhaps we can conclude that Posner is simply naive, unaware, or
simply unacceptant of sloppy thinking, especially in this area. How-
ever, it may be that he is particularly unwilling to participate in the
new game of judicial review, a venture in which language and review
functions are distorted. He was troubled that "the Board seems not
to have made up its mind . . . whether the immigration judge is a
sufficiently responsible officer to justify the Board's in effect delegat-
ing the making of the necessary discretionary judgment to him. '73
Posner's comments, indeed the entire scenario of this little case, may
reflect more than the intolerance of a former academic of intellectual
67. As shall be noted in the text, the standard of review may differ as to different
aspects of the discretionary decision.
68. Ortiz-Salas v. INS, 992 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1993).
69. Id. at 107-08.
70. Id. at 107.
71. Id. at 108.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 108.
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sloppiness; this case may, in microcosm, reflect some deep ambigui-
ties about discretion itself.
Maurice Rosenberg has noted at least two separate meanings to
the term "discretion. ' 74 He identifies these as "primary" and "sec-
ondary" types of discretion.75 By Rosenberg's account, primary dis-
cretion is decisionmaking discretion, freeing the decisionmaker from
the constraints of rules.76 This form has strong jurisprudential impli-
cations, raising some difficult questions about the relationship be-
tween rules and discretion.
Secondary discretion "has to do with hierarchical relations." 7 It is
an institutional concept, serving a review-restraining function. Thus,
this form of discretion substantially insulates the antecedent decision
from scrutiny and thus reversal. Yet, though Rosenberg's typology
has been criticized,78 couldn't his view account for the Board's incon-
sistency on its standard of review? Although Posner inveighed
against its inconsistency, perhaps the Board simply engages in de
novo review when it envisages discretion in this primary sense, yet
uses the abuse of discretion standard when it conceives of discretion
in the secondary sense.
Naturally, it is irrelevant whether this is an accurate description
of the Board's conduct, though it could be. But it is important to
recognize that discretion is an unmanageable legal concept precisely
because it has been used in such diverse ways. Thus, to ignore these
divergent uses, indeed different exercises of discretion, misses the
point that discretion is a vastly overburdened legal concept. A verita-
ble legal chameleon, it serves double, triple duty, and more. As
Wittgenstein observed, it is nonsense to think a variety of things are
the same just because you use a single word to refer them.79 Contin-
uing in that vein, though discretionary acts bear "family resem-
blances," 80 their differences cannot be ignored. These differences
must be recognized for judicial review to have some semblance of
coherence and efficacy.
74. See Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from
Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635 (1971).
75. Id. at 637.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Charles M. Yablon, Justifying the Judge's Hunch: An Essay on Dis-
cretion, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 231, 250 (1990).
79. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN. PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 11 67 (G.E.M. An-
scombe trans., 3d ed. 1958).
80. Id. at 67.
A. The Two Problems with Discretion: Definition and Context
For judicial review to operate competently, courts must recognize
two distinct problems with the concept of discretion. First, substan-
tial disagreement exists over the core meaning of the term. Before
analysis can proceed sensibly, we must agree, however provisionally,
on a meaning of discretion that effectively accounts for the use of the
term.
A second problem looms, though. Even assuming we agree on
what it means to exercise discretion, we must acknowledge the fact
that discretionary acts take place in a variety of settings. Thus, even
if we agree on what discretion means, we have to recognize that the
kind of scrutiny afforded discretionary acts may well vary with the
circumstances of its exercise. For example, rulemaking is different
from adjudication, and thus it might make sense to defer more
broadly to discretionary rulemaking than to its adjudicatory counter-
part. Indeed, this may explain much of Chevron. There, the Court
concluded quite tellingly that "the EPA's use of [the bubble] con-
cept here is a reasonable policy choice for the agency to make."81
The Court's reference to policy is helpful. Because of Congress'
lack of prescience, the Court afforded the agency substantial leeway
in its elucidation of the controlling statute. Yet it did that in the
context of rulemaking, an area in which the EPA was filling statu-
tory gaps to fulfill its mission. Rulemaking serves the function of
charting policy; it acts prospectively, thus allowing agencies to serve
their functions effectively.
But surely we recoil somewhat, at least, at the thought of agencies
deciding cases without reference to rules. The notion of purely dis-
cretionary decisionmaking in actual cases may trouble many. If it
does, it is because we suspect that the decisionmaker is acting uncon-
strained, and thus may, or at least can, act differently from case to
case. It is here that we confront the first problem of discretion. If we
envision discretion as somehow being the antithesis of rules, it also
may seem like the antithesis of law. And, unless the discretion is
guided by standards, the possibility of inconsistent and arbitrary
decisionmaking is always present.
Chevron dealt with the forging of policy, a choice of goals for the
EPA. Yet, as Dworkin has pointed out, legislatures choose policy
and we expect cases to be decided based on principles and rules.82
Thus, though it might seem desirable to depart from an established
rule in adjudication, our legal system accepts that departure in a
very narrow range of cases. We expect judges to apply the law in
81. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 845 (1984).
82. Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1057, 1059-60 (1975).
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deciding the cases before them.
1. Definitional Problems
Now we confront the first problem of discretion. As Dworkin said
elsewhere, "Discretion, like the hole in a doughnut, does not exist
except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction."8 It
only makes sense to talk of discretion in the context of a decision in
which the actor has some leeway for choice. Thus, whether we adopt
Dworkin's "weak" or "strong" sense of the term, discretion involves
a choice in which the decisionmaker is not bound to arrive at a cer-
tain result.84
But, though Dworkin warns us not to equate discretion with li-
cense,85 such confusion is virtually unavoidable and most certainly
occurs frequently. In fact, hasn't Professor Rosenberg done just that
in defining secondary discretion as a review-constraining concept?
Perhaps so, but even if he has not, discretion easily can be perceived
in that fashion. If no guidelines are placed on the decisionmaker,
then discretion and license appear identical. Similarly, if the decision
cannot be overturned, even if erroneous, then its very finality makes
the decisionmaker omnipotent, unanswerable to any review entity.
Disagreement about the core meaning of discretion has certain un-
fortunate consequences, then. If courts conceive of discretion as
somehow being outside a system of rules, then they can do little to
curb its abuse; indeed, the very concept of "abuse" may seem inco-
herent. Thus, at the outset, courts are plagued by an essential defini-
tional imprecision. That being so, it is little wonder that the abuse of
discretion standard, like "jurisdiction," is "a verbal coat of...
many colors." 86 Unsure of their proper institutional role, courts will
vary greatly in their exercise of this challenging review function.
Compounding the ambiguity of discretion is the role of standards
83. Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 32 (1967).
84. Id. at 32-33. Dworkin describes discretion in the weak sense in two ways. First,
it means that standards exist that cannot be applied mechanically, and judgment is re-
quired to make the decision. Id. This may be captioned "discretion as judgment." Id.
The second form of discretion in the weak sense involves decisions in which the official is
the final authority, "discretion as finality," if you will. Id. He uses the example of the
second base umpire whose decision on whether the ball or runner arrived first is not
subject to reversal. Id. He then contrasts discretion in the strong sense as meaning that
"on some issue he is simply not bound by standards set by the authority in question." Id.
at 33.
85. Id.
86. United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 39 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
for both the discretionary decisionmaker and those reviewing her ac-
tions. That is, over time, the Board has enumerated factors that
should be considered in guiding the use of discretion in some areas.
These factors provide the standards to be *used by immigration
judges.87 Accordingly, some courts are especially vigilant about de-
tecting departures from these standards.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has been especially active
here. In a recent decision,8 8 that court reviewed the denial of discre-
tionary relief from deportation to an alien who was convicted for a
drug violation and sentenced to a period of confinement. Initially, the
court was troubled by the Board's confusion over its own standard of
review for discretionary denials. Thus, quoting approvingly from
Judge Posner's comments from Ortiz-Salas, 9 it concluded that the
"BIA has no fixed situs for the basic discretionary determination and
thus no fixed standard for reviewing decisions by [immigration
judges] on 212(c) applications."90 Because the Board had not exer-
cised de novo review, the court decided that it must review the immi-
gration judge's exercise of discretion.
In reviewing that exercise, the court noted that discretion is
abused if the agency "fails to state its reasons and show proper con-
sideration of all factors when weighing equities and denying relief"
or includes an "improper factor in reaching a discretionary deci-
sion." 9' In this case, the court found that "the [immigration judge]
abused his discretion egregiously." '92 Yet, though this standard seems
sensible, it raises a strange anomaly. Presumably, the Board had no
obligation to create standards in this area. Yet, having done so, the
system was now subject to scrutiny for departure from those
standards.
This further confuses the notion of rules and discretion. It is odd
indeed that, had the Board not established standards for meting out
relief in this area, presumably the exercise would have escaped re-
versal. Yet, having done something it did not have to do, it exposed
the judge to reversal. Thus, though it is understandable and utterly
sensible for the court to require the agency to play by its own rules,
it is still odd that no obligation existed in the first instance to create
those rules.
87. See In re Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26 (BIA 1976); In re Edwards, No. A 18-274-
740, Int. Dec. 3134 (BIA 1990). Moreover, the Board has stated that these standards
are, by necessity, general. However, it requires the immigration judge to furnish an enun-
ciation of relevant factors when making the decision. That affords the Board with a basis
for its decision. In re Marin, 16 1. & N. Dec. 581, 585 (BIA 1978).
88. Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363 (9th Cir. 1993).
89. Ortiz-Salas v. INS, 992 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1993).
90. Yepes-Prado, 10 F.3d at 1367.
91. Id. at 1366.
92. Id. at 1370.
[VOL 31: 861. 1994] Discretionary Immigration Decisionmaking
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
This anomaly reflects the convergence of various threads of re-
view-denying thought, threads captured perfectly by Judge Easter-
brook in Achacoso-Sanchez.93 As noted above, Judge Easterbrook
invoked a variety of doctrines in noting the exceptionally narrow
scope of judicial review of discretionary action. However, much of
that rests on the rules-discretion dichotomy and his view that, unless
positive law supports a claim for relief, no claim of right exists and,
thus, no judge can impose one from on high.
Judge Easterbrook's language is particularly useful. He noted that
"[w]hen Congress does not lay down rules, its power devolves on the
executive branch, which then may consider factors of its own choos-
ing."194 Further, he rooted any claim of entitlement to the existence
of objective criteria created by statute or regulation. 95 By his view,
when there are no rules to apply, there is simply "'no law to apply'"
and the judge's role is "exceedingly constricted." '96 True, the Ninth
Circuit applied the Board's own standards in reversing it, but those
standards never had to exist. The Board could have gone along ad
infinitum without such standards. Thus, to premise legal relief on the
existence of standards, the creation of which is discretionary itself,
distorts completely even primitive notions of justice and thwarts ef-
fective review. And this all flows from discretion's uncertain legal
status.
Properly seen, then, Judge Easterbrook's opinion is about un-
reviewability law only derivatively. Primarily, the problems turned
on the jurisprudential dilemmas surrounding discretion. It is only be-
cause of those problems that reviewability became an issue. In fact,
Judge Easterbrook's rules-discretion dichotomy dovetails with the
somewhat dated rights-privilege dichotomy, thus bringing to mind
Dworkin's critique of positivist thought on discretion. Dworkin
wrote:
The positivists' doctrine of discretion (in the strong sense) required this
view of legal obligation, because if a judge has discretion there can be no
legal right or obligation - no entitlement - that he must enforce. Once
we abandon that doctrine, however, and treat principles as law, we raise the
possibility that a legal obligation might be imposed by a constellation of
principles as well as by an established rule.
97
93. Achacoso-Sanchez v. INS, 779 F.2d 1260 (7th Cir. 1985). See supra note 61
and accompanying text.
94. Achacoso-Sanchez v. INS, 779 F.2d 1260, 1264 (7th Cir. 1985) (emphasis
added).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1265 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985)).
97. Dworkin, supra note 83, at 45.
At the outset, then, confusion over the core meaning of discretion
has led commentators in a variety of directions, depending on their
jurisprudential inclinations. However, the focus on discretion and
standards by those such as Judge Reinhardt in Yepes-Prado"8
reveals the second problem with discretion. Even assuming agree-
ment can be reached on a core meaning, it is still foolish to think
discretion remains constant among a variety of situations and actors.
Judge Reinhardt assumed that standards should constrain the exer-
cise of discretion, that their existence created bounds for discretion,
thus making its exercise amenable to judicial review. This, in turn,
assumed a paradigm in which a decisionmaker is making factual
findings about an individual, thereby reaching a judgment about the
availability of discretionary relief. However, that reflects but one
view of discretionary justice, though a common one.8 9
It is not that Judge Reinhardt is wrong. On the contrary, he did
an exemplary job in that case. Rather, we must recognize that dis-
cretion is not a unitary concept. Accordingly, though the Ninth Cir-
cuit handled Yepes-Prado well, we must not be lulled into thinking
that the problems of discretion can be solved simply by requiring
immigration judges and the Board to apply standards consistently,
even though they are standards of their own making. That view ac-
cedes to a simplistic notion of discretionary conduct.
Considering the various forms of discretionary conduct, Charles
Koch observed that "[t]he average person seems to use the term dis-
cretion to mean decisionmaking authority that cannot be reversed by
a higher authority."100 Yet he made this observation while discussing"unbridled discretion," one of two forms of unreviewable discretion
by his thinking.101 He then went on to say that "there is very little
98. Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363 (9th Cir. 1993).
99. In fact, in their review of Davis' famous work, Baldwin and Hawkins criticize
Davis for being too limited in his view of discretionary behavior. They say that:
Davis's thesis, it should be clear now, is cast in a rationalist paradigm and rests
on a narrow view of discretionary behaviour - as simple, unproblematic, and
mechanistic. The broader view, derived from a naturalist paradigm, which pays
attention to the complexity of the decision-making process, shows that there
may be less to the idea of structuring than meets the eye.
Robert Baldwin & Keith Hawkins, Discretionary Justice: Davis Reconsidered, 1984
PUB. L. 570, 586. Davis' work is discussed supra note 26.
100. Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 469, 495 (1986).
101. Id. By Koch's thinking, discretion is divisible into five types. Discretion may
be individualizing, executing, or policymaking. These forms are subject to judicial re-
view. The final types of discretion are unbridled and numinous. These cannot be re-
viewed. See id. at 494-95.
Naturally, Koch is not alone in identifying different forms of discretion. In a recent
chapter, Carl Schneider identified quite a variety of forms of discretion, making balanced
arguments for and against discretion as opposed to rules. Indeed, he captioned his most
exotic version of discretion "khadi-discretion," a kind of discretion that relied entirely on
the consummate wisdom of the decisionmaker. See Carl E. Schneider, Discretion and
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good about unbridled discretion" and "the law should incorporate a
very strong preference against its proliferation, and, indeed, should
move away from inferring such discretion where it is not clearly es-
tablished by statute or the Constitution. ' 10 2 Strikingly, the very view
of discretion that should be resisted most strenuously seems to hold
sway, at least in common parlance.
But the differences between the EPA's actions in Chevron and an
immigration judge's decision in adjudication should be clear. In one,
an agency is forging policy, filling in some gaps in the law in a man-
ner presumably consonant with the governing statute. Here, in
rulemaking, we easily can accept a notion of judicial deference that
affords a presumption of correctness to the agency decision.' 03
Adjudication is entirely different. Though the judge is exercising
discretionary power, her conduct is more narrowly circumscribed by
traditional norms of judicial conduct. We simply expect her to follow
the law.' That is where discretion becomes problematic. To a point,
she is guided by statutes, regulations, and precedent. Beyond that
lies discretion. Here, Professor Koch's comments are essential. He
exhorts us to resist the notion of unbridled discretion. It seems like
anathema to legal process as we commonly understand it. Yet, in
this twilight zone of judicial conduct, in this area of discretionary
decisionmaking, judges seem least reviewable. We must ask just why
that is.
Rules: A Lawyer's View, in THE USES OF DISCRETION 47, 61-63 (Keith Hawkins ed.
1992).
102. Koch, supra note 100, at 502.
103. Naturally, this view represents a greatly simplified view of Chevron law. As
one commentator has stated:
A narrower reading of Chevron would require that the circumstances deter-
mine the amount of judicial deference to agency views on interpretive ques-
tions .... Such a reading would permit the courts to take a more
sophisticated approach when reviewing agency decisions. It would recognize
that the term "deference" refers not to one simple notion, but rather encom-
passes a range of methods by which courts may take account of other deci-
sionmakers' views.
Callahan, supra note 48, at 784. Accordingly, if we should shade deference in Chevron
settings, it follows that we should defer much more guardedly when an agency is acting
in an apparently much more rule-oriented fashion.
104. In an interesting foray into this debate, Professor George Christie established
an important difference between legislative choice and judicial choice. He said that "ju-
dicial choices, no matter how difficult, must be made on the basis of a circumscribed set
of criteria, whereas legislative choice may be based on a much more extended range of
criteria." George C. Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 1986 DUKE L.J. 747, 753.
2. Contextual Problems
Discussions of discretion naturally gravitate toward the hard calls,
calls that must be made swiftly and, hopefully, accurately. Sports
calls seem to provide useful examples. Thus it is that Professor Ro-
senberg discussed a wrong call made during a football game in 1961,
a call that, though wrong, was not reversed.10, Similarly, Dworkin
exemplified one weak sense of discretion by referring to calls made
by second-base umpires.10 6 Again, they may be wrong, but they're
final.10 7 Hopefully, these authors aren't indulging themselves, but are
drawing useful analogues from an accessible frame of reference.
And, they reveal two distinct notions of discretion: (1) discretion as
closeness and judgment, and (2) discretion as finality. 0 8
Discretion as finality seems to borrow little from the core meaning
of discretion. It would not seem that we are dealing so much with a
decision that represents the reflective wisdom of the decisionmaker
as one that must be made swiftly and decisively. As Professor
Yablon noted, "Discretionary decisions of this kind are justified not
because they are correct, but because they are close enough, and
making a finer determination is either not possible or not worth the
time and effort."' 0 9 Here, sports examples abound. The National
Football League used a form of instant replay for several years to
review some types of calls made by officials. However, under a bar-
rage of criticism, it abandoned it."10 That review was time-consum-
ing, disruptive of play, frequently redundant, and often inconclusive.
Thus, it was abandoned because our tolerance for error permitted
that. It simply was not worth the trouble, despite its potential to
correct error.
Though the legal system tolerates this form of discretionary con-
duct," we need not passively accept that. Adoption of this use of
discretion reveals fundamental values about speed and resource con-
servation, values that may be outweighed by the need for reflective
and reviewable judgments. Thus, the need for closure may be easily
overridden by other institutional norms. We should not easily accept
a form of discretion which simultaneously posits the existence of a
right answer, yet denies it controlling importance. At least we should
105. Rosenberg, supra note 74, at 639-40.
106. Dworkin, supra note 83, at 32-33.
107. Recall the statement made by Justice Robert Jackson that "[w]e are not final
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final." Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
108. Professor Yablon discusses these under the heading of discretion as skill and
discretion as expediency. Yablon, supra note 78, at 261, 268.
109. Id. at 269-70.
110. It was abandoned as of the 1992 season because 11 of 28 owners voted
against it in an owners' meeting.
111. Yablon, supra note 78, at 268-69.
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not do that unreflectively. Perhaps good enough simply isn't.
Yet, even if we repose a decisive value in finality, even if we can
tolerate the possibility of error, it is nonsense to treat all discretion-
ary decisions this way. Though it may make sense to defer to the
decision of an immigration judge, leaving that finding undisturbed, it
is quite another to defer for the same reason to a decision of the
Board or the Attorney General. The time constraints and resource
allocation problems are simply different as we ascend the institu-
tional hierarchy. Indeed, the bases for decisionmaking change as the
decisional arena changes. Thus, expediency cannot be the sole basis
for the carte blanche deference paid to discretionary decisions.
Writing about discretionary decisionmaking, Judge Henry
Friendly recognized certain real benefits to deference." 2 However,
he predicated extensive deference on the courts' "'first-hand obser-
vation or direct contact with the litigation.' "3 It is the closeness of
the judge at the trial level that commands our respect and, fre-
quently, deference. That is so because of her unique access to de-
meanor evidence and other evidence that loses its vibrancy when
placed under the microscope of appellate review. We may character-
ize this as discretion as closeness." 4 Oddly, as Professor Yablon
notes, this justification for discretion reverses "the normal assump-
tions of institutional competence."" 5 Presumably, trial courts exer-
cise a skill which cannot and should not be second-guessed in the
arid atmosphere of an appellate court.
Yet, having said that, it is obvious that this justification for ex-
treme deference to decisionmakers has two important qualifications.
First, from its nature, it applies uniquely to decisions made at the
trial level in which fact-intensive inquiry is crucial. Thus, it does not
transfer at all to decisions made by an appellate tribunal such as the
Board or those made by the Attorney General. Though it may be
that we should defer to these bodies for some reason, it surely is not
based on their closeness to the cases or skill in exercising judgment
on close factual calls.
112. Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 755-56
(1982).
113. Id. at 783 (quoting United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 817-18 (3d Cir.
1981)).
114. Professor Yablon took a similar tack in discussing discretion as skill. He as-
serted that "some forms of judicial decisionmaking, which I call 'discretion as skill,' in-
volve the exercise of a practice that is neither reducible nor justifiable in terms of a rule."
Yablon, supra note 78, at 262.
115. Id. at 267.
Second, even conceding that such deference is appropriate, that
may only be so once certain factual predicates are satisfied. It may
be that we should defer if and only if the decision is the product of a
reasoned inquiry informed by cognizable standards. If it is not, the
reason for deference dissolves. Thus, talk of discretion as skill or dis-
cretion as closeness only makes sense if the decisional process in-
volves the use of some set of accepted norms. If it does not, then we
are likely back in the morass of Professor Koch's unbridled
discretion. 1
16
Professor Schneider made this point, writing that the "decision-
makers' discretion is constrained by their socialization and train-
ing. 1" 7 From his view, lawyers and judges limit the range of accept-
able arguments because of their shared substantive, procedural, and
ethical norms.118 But is this true?
Here, a return to IYepes-Prado is instructive.1 9 Rigoberto Yepes-
Prado became a permanent resident in this country in 1974. Ten
years later, he was arrested in California for possession of heroin
with intent to distribute it. He was tried and convicted under state
law in 1986, and sentenced to one year in the county jail and two
years of probation. Based on that conviction, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service sought Yepes-Prado's deportation linked to
his violation of a law relating to controlled substances. 20
Yepes-Prado sought a discretionary waiver of deportation under
section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.' 2' Although
the immigration judge found equities in his favor, he denied the re-
lief. As noted previously, the Board affirmed under the abuse of dis-
cretion standard. 22
In reversing, the Ninth Circuit excoriated the immigration judge
for his reliance on irrelevant factors in denying relief. The judge
questioned Yepes-Prado at length about his "anti-social behavior by
fathering another child . . . out of wedlock" and also placed signifi-
cance in his failure to marry the mother of his children.123 Accord-
ingly, the unanimous panel stated that:
In sum, by considering the irrelevant factors of the legal status of Yepes-
Prado's relationship with Saavedra and her refusal to marry him, as well as
the "illegitimacy" of Yepes-Prado's children, the [immigration judge] based
his decision on unreasonable and improper factors rather than on legitimate
116. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
117. Schneider, supra note 101, at 81.
118. Id. at 81-82.
119. Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363 (9th Cir. 1993).
120. Id. at 1365.
121. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1988).
122. Achacoso-Sanchez v. INS, 779 F.2d 1260, 1264 (7th Cir. 1985). Although,
as Judge Posner noted, the BIA has been inconsistent here; it frequently engages in de
novo review after such denials.
123. Yepes-Prado, 10 F.3d at 1367-6& (omission in original).
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concerns about the administration of the immigration laws. In short, the
[immigration judge] abused his discretion egregiously.
124
Obviously, the socialization of this panel was different from that
of the immigration judge, thus exposing difficulties with Professor
Schneider's assumptions. The circuit court derived its norms from
perceived congressional policy on illegitimacy and rights to privacy
in sexual relations. By contrast, the immigration judge apparently
saw Yepes-Prado as a sexually irresponsible lout who flouted re-
ceived standards of morality. Yet, though the circuit court corrected
the error, its very occurrence is significant. Though Schneider's views
may make sense in some contexts, they appear entirely fanciful when
applied to immigration decisions.
Immigration decisionmaking reflects the same ambivalence and
conflict as does the national debate on immigration policy. As Peter
Schuck has written:
The ideological poles of the current debate are easy to categorize. At one
end are libertarians and free market purists. They favor not just expansion
but essentially open borders ....
At the restrictionist end is a melange of groups animated by anxieties
about migrants' effects on the environment, labor market competition, pop-
ulation growth, and public services.1 2
It is hardly surprising, then, that we cannot find a body of shared
social values among decisionmakers here. Quite understandably, they
fall prey to the same forces as others in the national debate and,
given the absence of real standards for decisionmaking, inconsistency
is a virtual certainty.
In fact, the very notion of "agency" decisionmaking sounds absurd
in this context. Though the unreviewability debate often turned on
attitudes about the democratic legitimacy of administrative agencies,
the immigration system represents a sprawling, diverse, and multi-
tiered bureaucracy, thus making any argument about democratic le-
gitimacy foolish.' 26 As Maurice Roberts said of discretionary immi-
gration decisionmaking, "[T]he fact remains that it is exercised by
124. Id. at 1370 (citation omitted).
125. Peter H. Schuck, The Great Immigration Debate, AM. PROSPECT, Fall 1990,
at 100, 101.
126. Although it is tempting to refer to the entire system as the INS, we must
recognize divisions within the Department of Justice. Thus, INS falls within the depart-
ment, but immigration judges are employed by the Executive Office of Immigration Re-
view. And, the BIA has no statutory basis, but is the product of the Attorney General.
Beyond that, the Attorney General herself has decisional authority over immigration
decisions.
impressionable and fallible human beings at all levels of the adminis-
trative hierarchy. . . . [For] in practice decision making has been
delegated to and is exercised by a host of lesser officials."1 , Little
wonder, then, that decisions vary with the attitude and personal phi-
losophies of the decisionmaker, with the hard-nosed types showing
greater conservatism than their more permissive counterparts. 12 8
The notion of discretion has, then, been distorted and tortured,
effectively eviscerating any core of effective meaning. It is now obvi-
ous that the exercise of discretion cannot be dissociated from its de-
cisional context. Decisionmakers are simply performing different
functions in different contexts, and to treat this melange of activity
as a piece wreaks havoc on legal doctrine. Thus, it is senseless to
adopt a single standard of judicial review for such a diverse array of
decisions.
Yet, many of these problems of review flow from the fact that
discretionary decisionmaking does at least seem to stand apart from
its rule-based counterpart. Unguided by fairly fixed standards, deci-
sionmakers would seem to be at liberty to mete out justice on an
individual, though unprincipled, basis. And, the resulting legal chaos
is somehow acceptable because we are dealing with aliens, frequently
aliens who have demonstrably outworn their welcome.
In the remaining parts, I will examine the contribution made by
courts (chiefly the Supreme Court) to the area of judicial review,
noting the clear message sent to lower courts to afford extreme def-
erence to agency decisions. Thereafter, I will consider just how this
should change. I will detail how judicial review must be fine-tuned to
cope with the potentially terrible legal problems suffered by aliens
facing expulsion.
III. RECALIBRATING REVIEW
A. Wang and Hernandez-Cordero
In INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 29 the Supreme Court made its first
major foray into discretionary immigration decisionmaking. In that
case, the Court faced a situation in which the Ninth Circuit had
overturned a Board decision denying the Wangs' motion to reopen
deportation proceedings to seek suspension of deportation.1
30
The Wangs came to this country as nonimmigrant treaty traders
127. Maurice A. Roberts, The Exercise of Administrative Discretion Under the
Immigration Laws, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 144, 147 (1975). No casual onlooker on im-
migration matters, Mr. Roberts has edited Interpreter Releases for decades and is a for-
mer Chair of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
128. Id. at 148.
129. 450 U.S. 139 (1981).
130. Jong Ha Wang v. INS, 622 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
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from Korea 131 and remained for a substantial period, although their
visas had long since run. Thus, having been present in this country
more than seven years, they sought suspension of deportation based
on allegations of the hardship that their deportation would occa-
sion.132 Essentially, their hardship claim was based on the fact that
they had two American-born children who would suffer education-
ally if deported, and the fact that they would suffer economically
because of a precipitous liquidation of their business assets.'
33
The Board found these claims unexceptional. Reasoning that they
were well-educated and had significant financial resources, the Board
concluded that their children would suffer no unusual hardship upon
returning to Korea.3 Similarly, the Board found that mere eco-
nomic detriment did not constitute extreme hardship. 35 The Ninth
Circuit reversed.' 36 Essentially, it reasoned that the Wangs had
made a prima facie showing of hardship, thus entitling them to an
evidentiary hearing on these claims.
Thus, in the Supreme Court, the case came down to the propriety
of the Ninth Circuit in affording the Wangs the opportunity to pre-
sent their claims fully in a hearing. Their claim below was not for
relief itself, but for the opportunity to pursue the claim on the mer-
its. This the Court denied them.
3 7
In its denial, the Court created layers of discretion that few appli-
cants can pierce. First, it noted that motions to reopen were once
discretionary, but now had a regulatory basis. 38 Yet, having said
that, the Court noted that "[t]he present regulation is framed nega-
tively; it directs the Board not to reopen unless certain showings are
made. It does not affirmatively require the Board to reopen the pro-
ceedings under any particular condition."' 9
131. In immigration parlance, a nonimmigrant is someone who has come to the
United States for temporary purposes. This contrasts with an immigrant, the person who
bears the so-called green card.
132. Suspension is available to an alien who, though deportable, has been physi-
cally present in the United States continuously for seven years, is of good moral charac-
ter, and can prove that deportation would "in the opinion of the Attorney General, result
in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or
child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence." 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(2) (1988).
133. Wang, 450 U.S. at 141-42.
134. Id. at 142.
135. Id. at 142-43.
136. Jong Ha Wang v. INS, 622 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
137. Wang, 450 U.S. at 143-45.
138. Id. at 143 n.5.
139. Id.
Now that's odd. Though the regulation says that such motions
"'will not be granted unless" the alien produces material and previ-
ously unavailable evidence, 140 that does not create either a negative
or positive bias in the regulation; it simply states the necessary con-
ditions that a motion to reopen must meet.'41 However, apparently
anxious to resurrect the previous discretionary nature of this relief,
the Court sought support from the dissenting opinion below, an opin-
ion decidedly jaundiced in its appraisal of alien movants. 4 z There,
Judge Wallace revealed a mood most inhospitable to aliens in depor-
tation. He stated:
If INS discretion is to mean anything, it must be that the INS has some
latitude in deciding when to reopen a case. The INS should have the right
to be restrictive. Granting such motions too freely will permit endless delay
of deportation by aliens creative and fertile enough to continuously pro-
duce new and material facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case. 14
Thus, in Wang, a case denied plenary consideration, the Court
concluded that reopening a case was discretionary. By that, it pre-
sumably meant that reopening could be denied if the alien seemed
particularly litigious or was otherwise seeking to leap to the front of
the immigration queue. And again, absent any coherent concept of
discretion, the Court's message appears clear: if reopening itself is
denied, courts should not intervene. This message was conveyed
through a footnote in Wang.1
4 4
As a procedural matter, then, the Court attempted to insulate de-
nials of motions to reopen from review. However, the opinion went
further. The Court rebuked the Ninth Circuit for reversing the
Board's substantive findings. 45 By the Court's view, the concept of
"extreme hardship," as a statutory term, should receive definitive
140. 8 C.F.R. § 242.22 (1994).
141. Speaking to this issue in a recent case, Judge (now Justice) Breyer stated:
We recognize that the regulation is phrased in negative terms, which means
that it does not explicitly grant any right to anyone ever to ask to reopen a
proceeding. Nonetheless, consider the words
nor shall any motion to reopen for the purpose of affording the alien an
opportunity to apply for any form of discretionary relief be granted...
unless the relief is sought on the basis of circumstances which have
arisen subsequent to the hearing.
Coupled with the Board's explicit authority to reopen any case, what could
those words mean but that the alien does have a right to move for reopening to
ask for "discretionary relief . . . on the basis of circumstances which have
arisen subsequent to the rehearing"?
Goncalves v. INS, 6 F.3d 830, 833 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1993))
(omissions in original) (citations omitted).
142. Wang, 450 U.S. at 143 n.5. The Court quoted the dissenting view of Judge
Wallace from Villena v. INS, 622 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1980) (en banc). That case was
heard by the circuit court en banc along with Wang.
143. Villena, 622 F.2d at 1362 (emphasis added).
144. Wang, 450 U.S. at 143 n.5.
145. Id. at 143-45.
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construction from the Board. It said of these words that "the Act
commits their definition in the first instance to the Attorney General
and his delegates, and their construction and application of this stan-
dard should not be overturned by a reviewing court simply because it
may prefer another interpretation of the statute."' 4
Now the Court has compounded administrative discretion. In ex-
tending it to the substantive application of a statutory standard, the
Court has doubly insulated the Board. That is, even if we may quib-
ble with the procedural denial (though no standards are provided),
we then confront the discretionary denial on the merits. Yet, though
it makes some sense to allow the Board to develop a usable standard
for "extreme hardship," that is not the Court's real message.
Early in the opinion, the Court chided the Wangs for failing to
provide the Board with anything but conclusory allegations of hard-
ship unsupported by affidavits."47 The Board then proceeded to de-
cide that economic and educational hardship did not meet the
statutory standard. " 8 Yet this must be wrong on two counts. First,
the Board cannot mean that in any categorical legal sense. At some
point, economic loss coupled with cultural and educational hardship
to U.S. citizen children simply must constitute "extreme
hardship."' 49
But second, and more importantly, the Court and the Board are
impaled on an inescapable contradiction. Unless they subscribe to
the view just refuted, they find themselves in the position of deciding
that the scant evidence presented is sufficient to deny the motion.
Somehow the conclusory statements of the movants are sufficient to
decide that they would not suffer "extreme hardship." You can't
146. Id. at 144. Although this quote has strong Chevron overtones, Wang predated
that case.
147. Id. at 143.
148. Id.
149. Indeed, in the wake of Wang many courts questioned the categorical nature
of that view, often concluding that economic detriment cannot be a per se bar to a hard-
ship claim. See, e.g., Santana-Figueroa v. INS, 644 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981). The court
in this case found that the total inability to get work could result in conditions that could
certainly create hardship. By its view, "These bleak prospects cannot rationally be said to
fall short of extreme hardship in all cases simply because they are traceable to 'economic'
causes." Id. at 1357. Despite this and like cases, at least one source reasoned that sub-
stantive review is precluded by Wang and that "effective judicial control of agency dis-
cretion to deny relief from deportation may be a short-lived phenomenon." Comment,
Developments in the Law - Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1286, 1398 (1983). However, despite this prognostication, it is clear that courts still
manage to distinguish Wang as they see fit. See generally Carrete-Michel v. INS, 749
F.2d 490, 492 (9th Cir. 1984) (distinguishing between mere economic hardship and the
complete inability to get work).
have it both ways. Surely you can fault the Wangs for submitting
unsupported claims, but you can't simultaneously conclude that the
underlying basis for their claim is inadequate. There is no evidence
to support that. Yet, since they are aliens seeking relief from depor-
tation, apparently that will do.
In sum, the Court has foreclosed the opportunity for aliens to
prove claims at an evidentiary hearing. It is absolutely correct in
asserting that the words "extreme hardship" are not self-explana-
tory,150 but by that very reasoning a hearing is required to explore
all facets of such claims. The questions are finally not legal, but in-
stead subtle, fact-driven inquiries about the potential lot of those ex-
pelled from this country. These questions simply cannot be answered
on an arid record by the Board, yet that is precisely what the Court
has approved. And, it has done this through its erection of a hydra-
headed discretion that doubly insulates Board decisions.
Wang sent a clear signal to lower courts to defer to administrative
determinations about hardship and, at all costs, to resist the urge to
engage in substantive review. This view was elevated to dizzying
heights by the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hernandez-Cordero v.
INS. 15 There, the court confronted a couple who had been here ille-
gally for twelve years 15 and had four children, three of whom were
citizens of the United States. The couple's application for suspension
of deportation was rejected by the immigration judge, and that result
was affirmed by the Board." 3 In affirming those results, the circuit
court created yet another layer of discretion and characterized that
discretion as "unfettered."' 54
The centerpiece for this decision was the Supreme Court's decision
in Jay v. Boyd. 55 There, the Court approved the Attorney General's
use of undisclosed, confidential material to deny an application for
suspension. Thus, although the Court did characterize the Attorney
General's ultimate discretion as "unfettered,"' 56 it did so based on a
barren record in a case that represented an embarrassment from the
Cold War era. The embarrassment in Hernandez-Cordero is the use
to which the Fifth Circuit put that relic.
First, the Fifth Circuit concluded that, though extreme hardship is
an eligibility requirement for relief, it represents a discretionary call
150. Wang, 450 U.S. at 144.
151. 819 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1987).
152. Mr. Hernandez had entered without inspection, and Mrs. Hernandez had
overstayed her visitor's visa. Id. at 559.
153. Id. at 559-60.
154. Id. at 562. Remember, of course, Professor Koch's admonition against the
creation of unbridled discretion. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text. Yet, it
is evident here that, rather than resisting this notion, the court embraced it with alacrity.
155. 351 U.S. 345 (1956).
156. Id. at 354.
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made by the Attorney General and is thus reviewed under the abuse
of discretion standard.6 7 This conclusion was based on the language
"in the opinion of the Attorney General," found in the suspension
statute."' 8 It thus concluded that language that candidly conceded
the subjective nature of the decision should therefore be read to
mean that the decision also was discretionary. And, though discre-
tion-bashing may seem wearisome by now, presumably the court
used that term to mean that the decision was final because it was
discretionary.15 9 Yet, although it erred in transforming an explicitly
legal decision into a discretionary one, it is easy to see how Wang led
to this.' 60
Yet, having labeled this decision as discretionary, the court had
not necessarily committed to an unspeakably deferential standard of
review. The abuse of discretion standard is adequately broad to pro-
vide for review, both procedural and substantive. Sadly, it is there
that the court used Boyd most illicitly and it is there that the "New-
speak" of discretion is most appalling.
If we conceive of the exercise of discretion as some kind of intel-
lectual exercise ungoverned by rules, then we must accept it as a
part of law's open texture; we must see it as an area in which rules,
as strict inhibitors, cannot hold sway. We commit, then, to the wis-
dom of these decisionmakers, trusting in their ability to act well. But
in Boyd we simply have no idea why the Attorney General denied
the application. Since the facts were undisclosed, we cannot examine
the decision at all. Five members of that Court simply accepted the
argument that national security prevented the disclosure of those
facts. Having labeled the action discretionary, it followed that no
real review was available.
However, an immigration judge who decides a hardship case is
157. Hernandez-Cordero, 819 F.2d at 562.
158. 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1988).
159. Yet, it is unclear just what the court meant by discretion. It could have sim-
ply meant, as suggested, that review is virtually nonexistent because a subjective decision
has been made. That could reflect Professor Rosenberg's notion of secondary discretion,
review-denying discretion. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. However, it
could just as easily have meant that since the immigration judge was closest to the case
and exercised some skill in reaching her decision, no legal standards exist that can effec-
tively repudiate that decision.
160. In fact, the dissent conceded that the language used "undoubtedly delegated
discretion to the Attorney General to determine in the first instance what is extreme
hardship." Hernandez-Cordero, 819 F.2d at 565. It is unfortunate, then, to see the con-
fusion wrought by this term, confusion not even confined to immigration law, but to
administrative law generally. The appendix to this opinion lists 169 statutes framed in
terms of the "opinion of" the decisionmaker. Id. at 570-74.
performing an entirely different function than that of the Attorney
General in Boyd. It is an entirely different sort of decisional process.
Despite this, the Fifth Circuit saw Boyd as precedential. It likened
the two decisions, noting that the Court defined the Attorney Gen-
eral's ultimate authority to suspend deportation as "unfettered" and
it saw "no reason why the Attorney General's discretion to deter-
mine extreme hardship should not be equally unfettered." 16' This is
classic "Newspeak." The reasoning consists of simply refusing to
think, "seeing no reason why" one thing called discretionary was not
like another so labeled. It reached this conclusion because "[b]y cre-
ating a two-tiered system of discretion, Congress intended the
threshold criteria to 'restrict the opportunity for discretionary' relief,
not expand it.' '
62
Not surprisingly, this court discerned a congressional policy hostile
to suspension applicants. Similarly, it sharply limited substantive re-
view, doubting that much, "'if any'" substantive review remains af-
ter Wang.6 3 And, as for procedural review, the court concluded that
the standard was whether the Board did "utterly fail" to consider
the factors pertinent to the hardship claim.164 Little wonder, then,
that the court affirmed the Board.
Hernandez-Cordero represents part of the new mythology of im-
migration decisionmaking. Although there is no single situs for deci-
sionmaking, though immigration judges have no congeries of
reasoning from which to draw, many review courts treat these cases
as a piece. If only in metaphor, they speak of the Attorney General's
decision as though she were really making these decisions and build-
ing a useful repository of expertise. They shy away from the fact
that, as the Hernandez-Cordero dissent notes, these decisions are
"made in the depths of the bureaucracy."615
Viewed in that manner, it is hard to see just why courts should
defer to agency decisionmaking. Though immigration judges deal
with these matters on a daily basis, there is no reason to believe they
know anything more about hardship than anyone else. Surely, given
Maurice Roberts' comments, there is every reason to suspect that
the decisions are driven more by predilections and ideology than by
any developed body of expertise.
Similarly, it's sheer fancy to think that immigration judges are
politically accountable. Nevertheless, piously citing Chevron, many
courts treat them as if they were. In Hernandez-Patino v. INS,'
161. Id. at 562.
162. Id. (citation omitted).
163. Id. (quoting from Ramos v. INS, 695 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 1983)).
164. Id. at 563.
165. Id. at 567 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
166. 831 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1987).
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the Seventh Circuit said that "in refusing to define 'extreme' hard-
ship fully, [Congress] avoided the substantive policy decision and has
deferred to agency expertise."' 67 Realistically, in the words of Pro-
fessor Pierce, Congress simply created an empty standard.16 8 Yet
that court treated congressional silence as consent for immigration
judges to make policy choices about the construction of the term
"extreme hardship." Surely Chevron need not support that.169
Relief from deportation must not be available for all aliens who
have avoided expulsion for the statutory period. However, its very
presence in the Immigration and Nationality Act indicates a theme
of forgiveness which must apply to some cases.170 Clearly then, a
balance must be struck between enforcement concerns and humani-
tarian relief. Yet, disturbingly, the scales are increasingly tipped in
favor of enforcement by the bureaucracy. Thus, as the Hernandez-
Cordero dissenters point out, "Review is meaningless if it is circum-
scribed by a standard that assures but one result.' 7' The adoption
of that standard represents an abdication of the responsibility to
maintain an independent judiciary.
B. Abudu: From Hardship to Persecution
The suspension cases dealt with claims of potential hardship
wrought by deportation. In INS v. Abudu,172 the claim was different.
167. Id. at 753.
168. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
169. The court cited Chevron:
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive
is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to
make such policy choices - resolving the competing interests which Congress
itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by
the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday
realities.
Hernandez-Patino, 831 F.2d at 753 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984)). It should be noted that Chevron
dealt with EPA rulemaking in the face of statutory ambiguity. Here, however, we are
dealing with immigration judges engaging in adjudication. Policy should play no role
here at all; to allow it is to encourage mere license.
170. See supra note 7.
171. Hernandez-Cordero v. INS, 819 F.2d 558, 565 (5th Cir. 1987). Indeed, as
one major casebook says: "Rather, the authority of a court to remand a case may ensure
that a dialogue occurs between the agency and the court-a conversation that considers
both law enforcement and humanitarian concerns. Is not such a dialogic process silenced
by Wang?" T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS
AND POLICY 626 (2d ed. 1991).
172. 485 U.S. 94 (1988).
There, Assibi Abudu sought reopening of his deportation case to ap-
ply for asylum and withholding of deportation.1 73 He sought to prove
that he had a well-founded fear of persecution were he returned to
his native Ghana.
Abudu had not applied for asylum below, but claimed that events
occurring after his deportation proceeding produced his fears. Spe-
cifically, he claimed that he was visited by a high-ranking official in
the repressive Rawlings regime who tried to lure him back to Ghana.
According to Abudu, he feared persecution because of his close asso-
ciation with Lt. Col. Joshua Hamidu, declared the number one en-
emy of the current government, and because his brother, consigned
to hiding, was similarly opposed to Rawlings."7 4 Thus, Abudu
claimed he would be persecuted if he were returned to Ghana until
he revealed the whereabouts of these two exiled enemies of the
government.
The Board denied Abudu's motion, concluding that it neither
made a prima facie case for the relief sought, nor revealed previously
unavailable information that could not have been presented at the
deportation hearing.17 5 Discounting the significance of the surprise
visit to Abudu, the Board concluded that the "visitor was admittedly
a long-time friend of the respondent's who in fact may have been
paying a purely social visit.
'17 6
Affirming the Board's decision, the Court wrote its most sweeping
opinion to date on discretionary 'denials in immigration cases, an
opinion that revealed an extreme distaste for motions to reopen.
First, the Court elevated from footnote to text the view it took in
Wang. Accordingly, the Board may deny the motion if the ultimate
relief sought is discretionary, "even if the alien has surmounted the
requisite thresholds of prima facie case and new evidence/reasonable
explanation.' 77 The standard of review for this denial is abuse of
discretion.
Similarly, the Court concluded that a denial based on a failure to
produce previously available evidence is likewise governed by the
abuse of discretion standard. This provided the basis for the affirm-
ance here. Thus, the Court did not reach the issue of whether the
application for withholding, a mandatory form of relief, could be dis-
cretionarily denied in the reopening context. Rather, it established
the abuse standard based on the "disfavor" in which reopening mo-
tions are held. It explained that "[t]here is a strong public interest in
173. Id. at 97.
174. Abudu v. INS, 802 F.2d 1096, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 485 U.S. 94
(1988).
175. Abudu, 485 U.S. at 97.
176. Id. at 98.
177. Id. at 106.
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bringing litigation to a close as promptly as is consistent with the
interest in giving the adversaries a fair opportunity to develop and
present their respective cases.1 178 Endorsing the values of expediting
proceedings and conserving judicial resources, the Court plainly dis-
approved these motions.1' Thus, the Court had "no hesitation in
concluding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion."' 80
As has been seen, though, an abuse of discretion standard may be
sufficiently generous to accommodate meaningful judicial review.
Even so, the Court gave a forbidding gloss to that standard. Explain-
ing why the Board should be deferred to, the Court said that "INS
officials must exercise especially sensitive political functions that im-
plicate questions of foreign relations, and therefore the reasons for
giving deference to agency decisions on petitions for reopening or
reconsideration in other administrative contexts apply with even
greater force in the INS context."'18 The message to the judiciary is
clear.
Remarkably, Justice Stevens relied on Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong,182 an opinion of his, in that passage, citing it for the view
that, since the power over aliens is political, it is subject to very lim-
ited judicial review.' 8 ' However, the passage cited simply reiterated
the plenary power doctrine, asserting the substantial power of Con-
gress to establish immigration policy. 8 4 It provided no support for a
court to venture off into foreign affairs in the course of deciding a
case before it.
On the contrary, in Hampton, Justice Stevens concluded that the
178. Id. at 107.
179. Maurice Inman, former INS General Counsel, expressed similar sentiments
in a memorandum he wrote to Regional Counsels in 1984. He said that "[w]ithout ques-
tion, motions to reopen are the most abused dilatory tactics. Frequently, they are 'mo-
tions to buy time.'" He went on to express the service position of opposition to such
motions before immigration judges and the Board unless service attorneys are certain of
the bona fides of the aliens' claims. INS Issues Instructions on Student Employment
Forms, 62 INTERPRETER RELEASES 507 (1985).
180. Abudu, 485 U.S. at 111.
181. Id. at 110 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
182. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
183. Abudu, 485 U.S. at 110.
184. In the footnote to which Justice Stevens cites, he quoted from an earlier case
that elaborated the plenary power doctrine. However, there, Justice Gray explicitly ac-
knowledged that the immigration power is "to be regulated by treaty or by act of Con-
gress." Hampton, 426 U.S. at 102 n.21 (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698, 713 (1893)). Simply labeling the power political in character says nothing
about just which branch of government is authorized to create policy. Surely, however,
no authority supports a court or other tribunal exercising that function.
Civil Service Commission lacked the democratic legitimacy to estab-
lish a rule requiring citizenship for the holding of federal jobs.'"s
Stating that "the Commission performs a limited and specific func-
tion,"186 he denied it the authority to venture into areas of immigra-
tion policymaking.8 7 Hampton constricted plenary power. It did not
expand it.'88
Yet here, he has conferred exceptional policy making power upon
the Board, something it plainly does not possess. The Board is an
administrative tribunal created by the Attorney General to decide
immigration appeals. It cannot legitimately decide political issues in
handling those appeals. Yet, by so anointing it, the Court has given
it a power and finality it should not enjoy. Plenary power has been
functionally expanded by Abudu.'89 Worse yet, this has happened in
the context of an asylum claim.
Just one year prior to Abudu, the Court decided the seminal case
of INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca.90 There, in another opinion authored
by Justice Stevens, the Court took the view that the evidentiary bur-
den on the asylum seeker was less than that on the withholding ap-
plicant. It did that despite the contrary positions taken by the
immigration judge and the Board. It did that despite Chevron.191
Justice Stevens felt impelled to protect the potential victim of per-
secution. He wrote:
185. Id. at 115-17. Apparently, Justice Stevens initially stood alone in proposing
this due process of law making model for deciding this case. The other members of the
majority would have struck down the civil service regulation on traditional equal protec-
tion grounds. Obviously, he persuaded the others to follow him, perhaps because this was
one of his first opinions. See BOB WOODWARD & STEVEN ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN
402 (1979).
186. Hampton, 426 U.S. at 114.
187. Id. "It is the business of the Civil Service Commission to adopt and enforce
regulations which will best promote the efficiency of the federal civil service. That agency
has no responsibility for foreign affairs, for treaty negotiations, for establishing immigra-
tion quotes or conditions of entry, or for naturalization policies." Id.
188. Resisting the government's arguments, Stevens did not agree "that the federal
power over aliens is so plenary that any agent of the National Government may arbitrar-
ily subject all resident aliens to different substantive rules from those applied to citizens."
Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
189. Though plenary power, as explained earlier, defines the roles of Congress and
the judiciary on immigration policy, Justice Stevens enlarged that notion here. Here, in
Abudu, he has conferred enormous power on a tribunal within the administrative system
while simultaneously limiting the power of Article III courts to review these decisions.
This clearly stifles an independent judiciary as we understand it.
190. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
191. The Court was, after all, construing the section of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act defining refugee. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988). However, irked by
what he regarded as a cavalier discussion of Chevron, Justice Scalia said: "But this ap-
proach [to Chevron] would make deference a doctrine of desperation, authorizing courts
to defer only if they would otherwise be unable to construe the enactment at issue. This
is not an interpretation but an evisceration of Chevron." Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at
454 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Deportation is always a harsh measure; it is all the more replete with dan-
ger when the alien makes a claim that he or she will be subject to death or
persecution if forced to return to his or her home country. In enacting the
Refugee Act of 1980 Congress sought to "give the United States sufficient
flexibility to respond to situations involving political or religious dissidents
and detainees throughout the world." 19
But all that distinguished these two cases was their posture on ap-
peal; Abudu came through the vehicle of a motion to reopen, Car-
doza-Fonseca did not. However, since both faced deportation to
countries in which they might have been persecuted, it is impossible
to reconcile the vastly different moods of these opinions.
Each party feared persecution if deported. This exceeds "extreme
hardship." Moreover, at the core, proof of a well-founded fear is
highly subjective and particularized. As David Martin wrote: "As
asylum processing demonstrates, establishing with reasonable confi-
dence that an applicant fears persecution and that the fear is well-
founded requires careful interviewing, steps to verify the events
claimed as the basis of the fear, and ultimately a difficult assessment
of the applicant's credibility."' 93 Yet it is absolutely impossible to
make these determinations on as barren a record as Abudu
presented. The significance of the surprise visit and the sincerity of
his response are simply undiscernible without a hearing. Despite
that, the Abudu court vaulted closure above these requirements.
Courts responded to Abudu swiftly, often endorsing the value it
placed on finality. Abudu left open the question of the standard of
review on a denial based on the apparent failure to prove a prima
facie case."'9 Some courts misread Abudu, citing it for matters it
never decided. 195 Others, taking its lead, extended its mood of intol-
erance toward reopening. M.A. v. INS'96 presents a vivid example of
this.
192. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449.
193. David A. Martin, The Refugee Act of 1980: Its Past and Future, 1982 MICH.
Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 91, 113.
194. "The standard of review of such a denial is not before us today, as we have
explained." INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104 (1988).
195. See, e.g., Johnson v. INS, 962 F.2d 574, 577 (7th Cir. 1992). The court
stated bluntly that: "Abuse of discretion is the proper standard of review when a denial
of a motion to reopen is based on failure to either establish the prima facie case or
introduce previously unavailable, material evidence." Id. Strikingly, it cited Abudu for
this proposition. Id.
196. 899 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1990).
In that case, M.A., a citizen of El Salvador, filed a motion to reo-
pen to pursue an asylum claim the day before his scheduled deporta-
tion.197 The immigration judge denied the motion and the Board
affirmed. A panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed, 9 " and the court
granted rehearing. Reversing the panel, the Fourth Circuit repeat-
edly noted that M.A. sought reopening of "completed" proceedings,
thus posing a threat to finality. 199
M.A. is significant both for what it held and for its reasoning and
tone. Showing an evident distaste for eleventh-hour appeals, the
court held that the standard of review for such denials is abuse of
discretion. In elaborating on that standard, it made clear that the
test in reopening is "more difficult to satisfy than statutory eligibil-
ity." 00 By its thinking, since the Board can deny a motion that es-
tablishes a prima facie case, there is "nothing incongruous" about
applying a "more demanding" standard in reopening.2 0'
Effectively denying federal courts review power over these deter-
minations, the court enlarged Abudu remarkably. Recognizing that
an asylum claim necessarily accuses a foreign state of engaging in
persecution, it noted that such policy debates should be conducted in
the political branches of government. It concluded that "federal
courts lack the expertise, and, more importantly, the constitutional
authority, to assume such a role. ' 20 2 This plainly reverses the roles of
the Board and the Article III courts.
This last observation left Judge Winter and the other dissenting
judges livid. To Winter, "[i]t is precisely the politicization of the
asylum process that troubles me, and suggests that heightened defer-
ence to the Board is unwarranted. 20 3 Resisting the mumbo jumbo of
the majority, he saw his task as the straightforward one of parsing
the evidence to assess the legitimacy of the alien's fear of persecu-
tion.20 4 In that, the Board has no advantage over a court.209
In marked contrast to the majority, Judge Winter saw no reason
to afford the Board "extraordinary respect" 206 based on any theory
197. Id. at 306. M.A. claimed to have left El Salvador to avoid aiding its vicious
military. Thus, his claim went, he sought asylum in the United States because of his
conscientious objection to those atrocities and his consequent fear that he would be perse-
cuted in El Salvador. Id.
198. M.A. v. INS, 858 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1988).
199. M.A., 899 F.2d at 309-10.
200. Id. at 310.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 313.
203. Id. at 319 (Winter, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 324.
205. Judge Winter cited Professor Legomsky, stating that "the BIA will have no
advantage over a court in assessing the legitimacy of [this] fear." Id. at 324 (quoting
Stephen H. Legomsky, Political Asylum and the Theory of Judicial Review, 73 MINN.
L. REV. 1205, 1213 (1989)) (alteration in original).
206. Id. at 309.
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of comparative competence. For him, as for Justice Breyer in an ear-
lier case, the review judge has "the typical role of a reviewing court
considering a typical decision of an administrative agency."2 ° Af-
fording extreme deference vests the Board with an unreasonably
unique expertise in fact-finding and an entirely unwarranted policy-
making power. And all of this flows from the improper view of
agency discretion and judicial review of its exercise.
C. INS v. Doherty
The case of Joseph Patrick Doherty" 8 presents one of the oddest,
most byzantine sagas in recent legal history. 09 Doherty, a former
member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, was tried in Bel-
fast for the killing of a British soldier on May 2, 1980, but escaped
before the court returned a verdict. He was convicted in absentia
and sentenced to life imprisonment. 10
Doherty fled Ireland, eventually making his way to New York
City, where he avoided detention another sixteen months. He was
arrested, and the INS promptly sought deportation. Doherty applied
for asylum, but immigration proceedings were suspended to process
an extradition proceeding requested by the United Kingdom. Extra-
dition was denied by Judge John E. Sprizo, who found that Do-
herty's acts presented the "political offense exception [to extradition]
in its most classic form."21
The suspended deportation proceeding resumed in September,
1986. Doherty conceded deportability and proceeded under a provi-
sion of the INA to designate his country of deportation as the Re-
public of Ireland. He waived any claim to asylum or withholding of
deportation. 2  The immigration judge and the Board assented to
Doherty's choice, but the INS opposed it. Claiming it "would be
207. Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 623 (1st Cir. 1985). Judge (now
Justice) Breyer further stated:
In doing so, we must keep in mind the fact that here no broad policy judg-
ments are at issue. Rather, the Attorney General has made a simple judgment
about facts; and we review that judgment with awareness both of the Attorney
General's comparative expertise and of the limits of reasonableness that he
cannot transgress.
Id. at 626.
208. INS v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719 (1992).
209. For an exceptionally detailed account of this, see James T. Kelly, The Empire
Strikes Back: The Taking of Joe Doherty, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 317 (1992).
210. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. at 722.
211. In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
212. Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d 1108, 1111 (2d Cir. 1990).
prejudicial to United States' interests" to deport Doherty to Ireland,
Attorney General Edwin Meese reversed the Board.21 a He ordered
him deported to the United Kingdom.
Prior to that decision by Mr. Meese, Doherty had sought reopen-
ing of his deportation case to seek asylum and withholding. His
change of heart was occasioned by a change in extradition law that
effectively would result in his return to the United Kingdom were he
deported to Ireland. Although the Board granted that motion, the
case was certified to the then-Attorney General Richard Thornburgh
for his review.214
Once again, an Attorney General, now Mr. Thornburgh, reversed
the Board. Citing foreign policy concerns, he believed U.S. national
interests required Doherty's return to the United Kingdom, thus jus-
tifying a negative exercise of his discretion.215 Moreover, from his
view, Doherty was ineligible for withholding because of his commis-
sion of a "serious nonpolitical crime outside of the United States." '
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that there
was no discretion to deny a hearing for mandatory relief (withhold-
ing), and that it was impermissible to consider the foreign policy
implications of an asylum claim.211-
The case was a cause celebre when it reached the Supreme Court.
Doherty had been incarcerated for more than eight years during
these legal proceedings and his case drew enormous attention. 8 The
case produced an extremely fragmented Court,21 9 thus apparently
carrying little precedential weight. However, in tone and in some
content, the case is ominous.
Superficially, the Court addressed only the narrow question of
213. Id. at 1112. Although 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h) (1994) authorizes Attorney General
review, such review takes place very rarely.
214. The Board found that Doherty had satisfied the two standards for reopening:
the requirement to prove a prima facie case for the relief sought and show previously
unavailable evidence. Specifically, it found that the change in the Irish extradition law
and the Attorney General's decision demonstrated changed circumstances from those ex-
isting during the initial hearing. Doherty, 908 F.2d at 1112-13.
215. Id. at 1111-21. Mr. Thornburgh stated emphatically that "it is the policy of
the United States that those who commit acts of violence against a democratic state
should receive prompt and lawful punishment .... [Deporting Doherty] would unques-
tionably advance this important policy." Id. at 1121 (citation omitted) (omission in
original).
216. Id. at 1116 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(c) (1988)).
217. Id. at 1117-18.
218. In fact, 132 members of Congress filed an amici brief with the Court. The
membership was diverse, including, for example, Orin Hatch (R-Utah). Brief for Amici
Curiae Members of the United States Senate and Members of the United States House
of Representatives in Support of Respondent, INS v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719 (1992)
(No. 90-925).
219. Only Part I of the opinion drew a majority, in which Justices White, Black-
mun, O'Connor, and Kennedy joined Chief Justice Rehnquist.
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whether the Attorney General abused his discretion in denying Do-
herty's motion to reopen. 220 Thus, although the Second Circuit found
that Attorney General Thornburgh had impermissibly relied on for-
eign policy concerns in denying Doherty's motion, the Court reversed
it based on Thornburgh's more technical findings. 221
However, in reversing the Second Circuit, it greatly fortified the
notion of unbridled discretion. First, discussing the discretion of the
Attorney General, it characterized it as "broad discretion. 222 Thus,
having already recited the now-familiar litany about the undesirabil-
ity of motions to reopen,223 it effectively concluded that the Attorney
General's denials should virtually command affirmance.
Second, it based this extreme deference on the authoritative status
of the Attorney General. In choosing the Attorney General over the
Board, the opinion stated that "the BIA is simply a statutory crea-
ture of the Attorney General, to which he has delegated much of his
authority under the applicable statutes. He is the final administrative
authority in construing the regulations, and in deciding questions
under them. '2
24
But this is not a case in agency law in which we must acknowl-
edge that the agent acts at the principal's behest. Rather, we have
the extraordinary spectacle here of the Attorney General having
overturned the finding of a panel that deals with such cases on a
daily basis. Thus, the Board would seem to have the upper hand over
the Attorney General as a matter of comparative competence. Nev-
ertheless, despite the Court's statements about expertise in Wang,
deference to him could have been founded on little else than the in-
clination to affirm a denial. A persistent line of subtext, discretion as
220. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. at 725.
221. Id. at 723. Mr. Thornburgh found that Doherty had not presented new evi-
dence warranting reopening and had waived his claims to asylum and withholding. Thus,
the Court did not address his conclusion that Doherty had committed serious nonpolitical
crimes that made him statutorily ineligible for humanitarian relief. Id. However, the
political maneuvering in this case is clear. For a closer examination of the conduct of the
Attorney General, see Joan Fitzpatrick & Robert Pauw, Foreign Policy, Asylum and
Discretion, 28 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 751 (1992).
222. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. at 726. "We hold, for the reasons stated in the opinion of
the Attorney General, that it was well within his broad discretion in considering motions
to reopen to decide that the material adduced by respondent could have been foreseen or
anticipated at the time of the earlier proceeding." Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis
added).
223. Id. at 724.
224. Id. at 726 (citation omitted).
denial, now emerged quite evidently.2 25 And, this view, quite ironi-
cally, prevents the establishment of a body of reasoning that speaks
to the future.
Finally, the Court examined the Attorney General's basis for de-
nying the motion, concluding that it was supported by the evidence.
Accordingly, it concluded that "[t]he mere fact that he disagrees
with a conclusion of the BIA in construing or applying a regulation
cannot support a conclusion that he abused his discretion. 22 0
But the Court affirmed his decision to deny Doherty an opportu-
nity to prove asylum or entitlement to withholding. In reaching that
conclusion, it stated that the abuse of discretion standard applies
"'regardless of the underlying basis of the alien's request [for re-
lief].' ",227 And it is here that its dislike for reopening is most malign.
It is here that its "docket-clearing mindset"228 is most troubling.
The broad discretion afforded the Attorney General applied to all
denials of motions to reopen, regardless of the relief sought. Thus,
the Court presumably treated this case the same as one in which the
alien sought relief based on some claim of lesser urgency. However,
as Justice Scalia pointed out in his separate opinion, this ignores the
229"imperative language" of the withholding provision.
Withholding of deportation embodies an essential notion of hu-
manitarian law: a refugee shall not be returned to a state of danger.
Discretion doesn't exist here; in both domestic and international law,
nonrefoulement is mandatory.2 30 In enacting the Refugee Act of
1980,231 we adopted this notion of nonfoulement from international
225. Though it is conceivable that the Court was sounding the note that decisions
should be made by parties most accountable, there is no indication that it did so, nor is
there any reason to believe that the Attorney General is truly accountable for her immi-
gration decisions.
226. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. at 727.
227. Id. at 725 (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 99 n.3 (1988)) (alteration in
original). There, the Court said that "the focus throughout the proceedings has been on
the asylum application, and our discussion will maintain the same focus. This focus
should not obscure the fact that our holding today applies to BIA reopening decisions
regarding both asylum and withholding of deportation requests." Abudu, 485 U.S. at 99
n.3. Thus the Court changed its focus from the first sentence to the second on a matter
not properly before it.
228. Kevin R. Johnson, Responding to the "Litigation Explosion" The Plain
Meaning of Executive Branch Primacy Over Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REv. 413, 477
(1993). Professor Johnson was co-counsel on the amici brief submitted on behalf of the
congressional members to the Supreme Court in Doherty.
229. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. at 729 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
230. The term nonrefoulement derives from the French word refouler, which
means return. See Dictionnaire Larousse 631 (1981) (Francais, Anglais).
231. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (amending Immigration and Nationality
Act, §§ 101(a)(42), 207-209, 243(h), 411-414) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101(a)(42), 1151-1153, 1157-1159, 1181-1182, 1243(h), 1521-1525 (1982)).
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law.2"2 As a consequence of the Court's decision, though, the Attor-
ney General could deny an applicant the very opportunity to prove
her status as a refugee.23 3 Again, presumably because of concerns
about resource allocation and docket-clearing, a hearing may be de-
nied so long as the Attorney General provides any remotely credible
basis for that denial. And, again, as with Abudu, this was done in
the subtle, fact-driven context of refugee law.
At that point, Justices Scalia, Stevens, and Souter split with the
plurality opinion. Acknowledging that "[e]ven discretion . . . has its
legal limits, ' 23 4 they sought to narrow the discretionary power to
deny a hearing where the claim was for withholding. Chafing at lik-
ening a motion to reopen to reopening a final judgment, they analo-
gized it to "remand for further proceedings. 23 5 Thus, they
recognized that in many cases an applicant must be given the oppor-
tunity to prove factual matters that "'cannot be adequately resolved
in the absence of an evidentiary record.' ",236 And, the need for a
hearing is pointedly obvious when an alien seeks to prove refugee
status.
But even Justice Scalia admitted that discretion still existed to
deny the reopening itself, regardless of the procedural merits of the
alien's claim. Though he concluded that the Attorney General had
abused his discretion on the procedural calls, he admitted that he
could still have denied the motion qua motion.23 7 However, though
conceding that, he said that it wasn't "as discretionary . . . as the
term 'reopening' might suggest. '238
232. Nonrefoulement is embodied in article 33 of the United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, done July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 176. Under
it, "[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or po-
litical opinion." Id.
233. The withholding applicant must essentially prove that she is a refugee. Thus,
even though the Court created a higher burden of proof for one seeking withholding in
INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407 (1984), that does not change the kinds of evidence that must
be produced in both cases.
For criticisms of the Stevic decision, see Michael G. Heyman, Redefining Refugee: A
Proposal for Relief for the Victims of Civil Strife, 24 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 449, 483
n.144 (1987); ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 171, at 758.
234. INS v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719, 728 (1992).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 736 (quoting Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d 1108, 1117 (2d Cir. 1990)).
237. Remember the statements in Wang and Abudu that some latitude must exist
to deny a motion even if it has surmounted the procedural hurdles of proving a prima
facie case and adducing previously unavailable evidence.
238. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. at 734. However, though it makes good sense to nuance
Despite Justice Scalia's protestations,23 9 Doherty solidified the
Court's position that the Attorney General has enormous and virtu-
ally unreviewable discretion in deciding immigration cases. Though
the case could be confined to its narrow facts, and indeed only ex-
tended to the personal acts of the Attorney General, Doherty more
likely emphatically reaffirmed the powerlessness of aliens to receive
meaningful review of discretionary decisions. And, it explicitly ex-
panded the ambit of those decisions to include denials of mandatory
humanitarian relief. The prospects for aliens would seem quite bleak
after Doherty.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
In Doherty our legal system ultimately failed us badly. Doherty
prevailed in virtually every tribunal except the Supreme Court and
the Attorney General's Office. He avoided extradition in district
court and succeeded before the Board and Second Circuit. But the
Supreme Court's opinion is forbidding; it sought to silence effective
discussion of discretionary decisionmaking without advancing its de-
velopment one iota. And, in doing that, it again approved the ill-
considered expansion of discretion to the motions themselves and to
mandatory humanitarian relief.
However, room remains for an independent judiciary to review
both procedural and substantive claims. Ironically, because of the
very distortions wrought to the term "discretion," lower courts may
still be able to act independently of the administrative bureau-
cracy.240 Indeed, to maintain an effective legal system, they must do
SO.
In virtually all judicial discussions of discretion a critical fact went
unnoticed: review is most extensive where standards exist, yet most
obviously limited where they do not. In the words of one commenta-
tor, this represents an "inverted analysis."'241 Litigants are better
the scope of review for discretionary decisions, talking about something not being "as
discretionary" as something else tries coherence. Quite likely, it simply demonstrates the
intellectual morass created by the word discretion.
239. And, they have their limits, too. The Court was unanimous in affirming the
Attorney General on the asylum claim. There, Justice Scalia concluded that "Doherty is
a sufficiently unsavory character not to be granted asylum in this country." Id. at 730.
That is hardly an intellectually satisfying approach to abuse of discretion review.
240. That is, since discretion has been divested of almost all meaning, courts can
engage in abuse of discretion review without denigrating its exercise. By this point, dis-
cretion only means some sort of exercise of judgment not cabined by rules. But since the
Administrative Procedure Act provides for review for abuse of discretion, courts are not
nearly as stifled as we might expect.
241. Tim Searchinger, Note, The Procedural Due Process Approach to Adminis-
trative Discretiorn The Courts' Inverted Analysis, 95 YALE L.J. 1017 (1986).
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protected when agencies must apply standards when exercising dis-
cretion and review courts have some bases for determining the legiti-
macy of their exercise. However, where the naked word "discretion"
appears, the decisionmaker below and the review court would seem
to be at a loss.
Since Congress has not produced meaningful standards, the duty
falls on review courts to fill that vacuum. Thus, "[i]nstead of viewing
unlimited discretion as a reason to limit judicial review, courts
should treat the breadth of discretion as a 'process' variable which
they can influence and for which they can order compensating proce-
dural checks. 242 This seems especially true when we are dealing
with a politically powerless group such as aliens. Our legal history is
replete with examples of the governmental mistreatment of aliens,243
and we have had limited impetus for the protection of those who are
concededly subject to deportation.
Discussion of the inhibitions of Chevron and Heckler is not only
wearisome then, it misses the mark. The matters under discussion
involve questions of law and fact that courts are uniquely equipped
to handle. We are not dealing with administrative policymaking, but
with adjudication. Thus, the most persuasive answer to those who
deny courts the authority to decide these cases is that they are al-
ready doing it. And in so doing, they are doing precisely what is
required of an independent judiciary.244
Review standards for discretionary decisionmaking must recognize
differences in the exercise of discretion. Though I previously noted
that the case law has confused discretion with the simple exercise of
judgment,245 absent any overruling, we are stuck with that law.
242. Id. at 1018.
243. Chae Chan Ping v. United States,- 130 U.S. 581 (1889), the Chinese Exclu-
sion Case, and Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), are simply among
the more egregious examples. There, both Congress and the Supreme Court demon-
strated an almost reprehensible disdain for Chinese residents of the United States.
244. See Hirshman, supra note 34, at 675-76. Similarly, Judge Joseph Weis said
that "[a]rguments advocating judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations are
simply not supportable in the absence of actual, not theoretical, agency expertise or spe-
cific delegations of power. An argument for deference deserves careful consideration only
when those factors are present." Joseph F. Weis, Jr., A Judicial Perspective on Defer-
ence to Administrative Agencies: Some Grenades from the Trenches, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 301,
304 (1988).
245. That is, the Hernandez-Cordero court and others translate the language
about the Attorney General's "opinion" into discretion. That has no basis, for Congress
was simply noting that a finding of hardship is subjective. Its choice of language conveys
that naturally. So too, though, for a multitude of findings. Thus, these courts confuse a
simple judgment call with a discretionary finding.
However, courts still may play a major role in developing this area
of immigration law. In doing so, they must deal differently with find-
ings of an immigration judge and affirmances of the Board flowing
from an evidentiary hearing, and with motions to reopen.
When an immigration judge (or the Board) decides a discretion-
ary matter after a hearing, her decision is subject to two forms of
review, procedural and substantive. Courts are still quite willing to
review such findings for procedural regularity, as they should. Thus,
in Turri v. INS,24 6 the court reversed the denial of suspension to the
alien. It found that, although the Board recited a "laundry list of
potentially relevant factors, 247 it failed to adequately consider the
evidence presented by Turri. Presumably, this reversal can lead to a
more careful consideration by the Board on remand.248 Requiring
closer scrutiny can only advance the development and application of
the law.
Courts should not be limited, though, to review for procedural de-
fects. As Wang and its progeny demonstrate, the Board has no cor-
ner on wisdom, and substantive review also can lead to the progress
of the law. Thus, though that case seemed to take the view that eco-
nomic detriment cannot amount to extreme hardship, later cases
have shown how, at some point, it must.249 Similarly, courts have
developed the substantive law of hardship in other areas, thus ad-
vancing the development of the law.
In engaging in this dialogue with the immigration judges and the
Board, review courts can further the law. Thus, though some courts
may simply substitute their judgment for that of the Board, positing
that as a certainty represents a cynical view of judicial review that,
taken to its extreme, rejects the very legitimacy of an independent
judiciary. Through this cooperative effort of the Board and courts,
this area of law can mature effectively.
Courts must be particularly vigilant, however, in their review of
discretionary denials of motions to reopen. There, quite frequently,
246. 997 F.2d 1306 (10th Cir. 1993).
247. Id. at 1310.
248. We see the fruits of such a remand in Akinyemi v. INS, 969 F.2d 285 (7th
Cir. 1992). There, the court reversed the Board's denial of an application for discretion-
ary relief from deportation. Though the Board concluded that it did not have to address
the issue of Akinyemi's rehabilitation, the court disagreed, requiring the Board to ad-
dress that issue specifically. On remand, in an undesignated opinion dated May 18, 1983,
the Board found outstanding equities in the case and substantial efforts toward rehabili-
tation. BIA Finds Rehabilitation, Grants § 212(c) Relief on Second Go Round, 70 IN-
TERPRETER RELEASES 1059 (1993). Thus, though the Board admonished Akinyemi that
its "reserve of compassion had been exhausted," it nevertheless afforded him the relief
sought. Id.
249. Santana-Figueroa v. INS, 644 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), and other cases
demonstrate the vacuity of such blanket statements about the content of concepts such as
extreme hardship. Certainly, total economic destitution can wreak such havoc on a fam-
ily that anyone can recognize it as extreme hardship.
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the Board plainly has no record on which to act, yet acts nonetheless.
It is here that discretion is most insidious, for here it is least guided
by rules or standards. Here, its actions least represent the exercise of
expertise. Indeed, it is hard to imagine discussion within the Board
being anything other than a shouting match between those who favor
denial and those who don't.
Courts must be particularly active here, for often the stakes are
greatest, yet the process most wanting. For that reason, courts
should be guided by the thinking of Matthews v. Eldridge.25 °
Though, technically, due process is not involved, the Matthews anal-
ysis provides a perfect paradigm for review courts. Matthews tells us
to evaluate the adequacy of the process by considering the private
interest, the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest, and the
governmental interest, including the fiscal and administrative bur-
dens that a substitute form of procedure would entail.
25'
When the Board's denial is based on procedural irregularity such
as the failure to prove a prima facie case, a review court is perfectly
suited to review that denial. Moreover, as with Abudu and Doherty,
where the alien seeks a hearing for humanitarian relief, courts must
be particularly careful in determining whether the Board showed
proper concern for the claim. The interest can be most grave, the
risk of error profound, and the government's interest largely one in
avoiding delay and costly hearings. Yet, antipathy toward some ex-
cessively litigious aliens should not result in wholesale denials of the
precious right to be heard.
The most offensive denials, though, are those in which the Board
either simply denies relief which is itself discretionary, or denies the
motion itself despite the bona fides of the alien's claim. In each case,
some ineffable value judgment has propelled the Board, yet no work-
able standard exists for assessing its legitimacy. Here, then, the
Board proceeds most dangerously, and here the courts should defer
least. No plausible reason supports deference, and its actions should
command little respect.
Above all, review courts must not act reflexively.252 They must
perform their traditional role impartially, with neither a positive nor
250. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
251. Id. at 335.
252. For example, within one month, Judge Politz, in similar circumstances, cited
Chevron to dispose of one case, yet cited Overton Park in another in which he reversed
the Board. See Fonseca-Leite v. INS, 961 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1992); Diaz-Resendez v.
INS, 960 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1992). That won't do. Neutral principles must apply alike
to the unsavory and appealing case.
negative bias toward the Board or immigration judge. If all deci-
sionmakers act in this fashion, and if all engage in the cooperative
task of advancing the law, favoring neither the values of enforcement
nor those of the necessitous alien, they have performed their duty in
a manner that speaks effectively to the future. We can ask no more.
